Visit our website for other free publication
downloads
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
To rate this publication click here.

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to
national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic
studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics
having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of
special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of
conferences and topically-oriented roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the
Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation.

Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

HOW NATION-STATES CRAFT
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
DOCUMENTS

Alan G. Stolberg

October 2012

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications
enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them
to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should
be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013.
*****
The crafting of this monograph would never have been possible without the incredible support of so many. For this, and
so much more, I will always be grateful. There are some that I
absolutely must make mention of: to Professor Douglas Lovelace
and Dr. Anthony Echevarria of the Strategic Studies Institute
of the U.S. Army War College, thank you so much for the great
financial and moral support; to the U.S. Army War College for
the willingness to provide me the time for a 6-month sabbatical
to conduct the research that was so key to the analysis; to the
many men and women in each of the five countries that worked
on their nation’s national security strategy documents and their
readiness to share their experiences, both good and bad, with me.
Within each country, there were always one or two that stepped
forward in a special way to hold my hand and open the key doors
that I needed to pass through: Dr. David Connery for Australia,
General of Division Gerson Menandro in Brazil, Helmoed Heitman for South Africa, Sir David Omand in the United Kingdom,
and in the United States, former National Security Advisor Steve
Hadley provided time that he did not have in numerous ways to
help shape this document’s outcome. There were others behind
the scenes who helped make this all happen, to include Mr. Kia
Ghorashi who always ensured that I had a vehicle to communicate with former NSA Hadley, Ms. Saline Guimaraes Currin who
served as my superb Portuguese translator at an absolutely critical period, and to Ms. Tara Colyer, who made sure that I could
travel wherever and whenever I needed. To all of these, as well
as those space will not permit me to mention, thank you.
There will never be a way that I could truly thank my family enough for both supporting and putting up with this journey
during this past year. For my love, Dianne, thank you as always
for the support that you gave me.

ii

*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be
downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of
this report may also be obtained free of charge while supplies
last by placing an order on the SSI website. SSI publications
may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission
and appropriate credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail
newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and
upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research
analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please
subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.
army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-550-X

iii

FOREWORD
In some manner, shape, or form, every nation state
in the international system has a national security
strategy or strategies. These strategies are intended to
guide the state as it makes its way through the labyrinth of challenges that every nation state faces in the
21st century. The strategy could represent the nation’s
overall grand strategy or it could be a national security-related strategy for one particular issue, like force
structure development for the armed forces. Strategy
making is an art; not a science. Sometimes these strategies work and sometimes they do not. Some are effective and efficient as desired and others are less so.
The focus for this assessment is how a nation state can
craft the most effective and efficient national securitytype strategy possible.
To address these key questions, the national security strategy development processes in this monograph were examined and contrasted in five different
nation-states to determine the methodologies they
employed. For each case study, members of the government who actually worked on the development of
the national strategy document in question were interviewed. These individuals—civil servants, career
military officers, and senior political appointees—all
had a story to tell about the separate approaches to
strategy formulation.
In the analysis of the strategy development processes utilized by Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the
United Kingdom (UK), and the United States, it became apparent that there were both similarities and
differences in the manner that each nation conducted
its strategy formulation. But most important, each
one of national strategy development processes was

v

found to contain elements that could have real value
for those countries not employing those particular approaches. Australia and the UK were superb in ensuring true whole of government coordination, as well
as concurrent application of the government’s budget
process and the formal administration of a risk assessment for the given strategy. Australia and South
Africa did a superb job in bringing civil society into
their document formulation processes. Brazil was exceptional in the creation of detailed ways and means
critical for strategy implementation. Finally, the U.S.
approach included addressing all elements of national
power, as well as the identification of potential strategy modifiers if the national strategy was found not to
be working in certain areas.
Given the complexities of the 21st century in the
national security arena, the Strategic Studies Institute
believes that assessments like the one you are about to
read will be crucial to both practitioners and academics alike to gain greater understanding for the most
effective and efficient approaches to national strategy
making in the 21st century.

			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a
spectrum of comprehensive national security strategy-related documents that have been created, in part,
to institutionalize the existence of national-level direction for a variety of national security issues and to do
this at the unclassified level for the public audience of
those democratic nations, as well as in some cases, for
external audiences. The intent of this monograph is to
explore the actual processes that nation states employ
to craft their national security strategy-related documents. The focus is specifically oriented on how to
perform such analysis for the development of national
security strategies (NSS).
For each of the case studies in question, this monograph will address the oversight, strategic context, national interests and domestic political considerations,
facts, and assumptions used to frame strategy development, objectives and measures of effectiveness,
ways and means, risk assessment, the identification
of a formal feedback mechanism, and who within the
government had the final approval authority for the
document. Five countries and their national strategy
documents were selected for assessment: Australia,
Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom (UK), and
the United States. For each case, at least one national
strategy document was evaluated per country and
more than one department or ministry from the government’s executive branch participated in each nation’s document drafting process.
The Australian approach to national strategy
formulation as demonstrated by the developmental processes utilized for the 2008 National Security
Statement and the 2009 White Paper (WP) indicates a
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clear focus on crafting whole of government coordinated documents. Participating actors would be found
to be negligent if they did not coordinate. The formulation process emphasizes inclusion of the managers
who control the fiscal means at every step of decisionmaking for these efforts. In addition, the risk analysis
concept is becoming fully institutionalized. Finally, a
wide spectrum of Australian civil society was formally
solicited for its thinking on the major issues confronting the 2008 WP drafters.
The Brazilian 2008 National Strategy of Defense
(NSD) represents the first national strategy of its
kind in Latin America. In combination with the 2005
National Defense Policy and the forthcoming WP, Brazil
is developing a systematic approach to the crafting of
national strategy. Of particular note is the Implementation Measures component of the NSD and the associated degree of fidelity with the strategy’s ways and
means. With the publication of the strategy, this approach provides the ministries and agencies responsible for strategy implementation with the planning
information necessary to begin detailed execution.
Both the South African White Paper and Defence
Review assisted the nation in moving beyond the
apartheid era. The documents provided a nationallevel strategy for the defense establishment on its role
in the society writ large, as well as the approach in
the form of ways and means to execute that strategy
with the nation’s armed forces in the near to midterm.
These documents were guided in detail by the state’s
legislative body and uniquely supported by the significant inclusion of civil society throughout the course
of their development processes.
The evolution of the UK national strategy development process since 2007 has been significant, especially
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with the inclusion and alignment of the means (fiscal
resources in the budgeting process) and the utilization of the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA)
in analysis of risks and related national interests. This
is especially true in the linkage between the NSS and
the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), along
with the connectivity between the ends, ways, and
means contained in the two documents. While an excellent tool, one potential drawback of the formalized
risk analysis process contained in the NSRA is that
the strategy’s ultimate objectives may be framed more
than they should be in terms of risks and challenges,
rather than opportunities. Thus, the focus could be on
problem solving as opposed to “goal seeking,” having
the ultimate effect of inhibiting strategic thinking.
The U.S. NSS is the only complete whole of government national security document that the U.S. Government publishes. The NSS is best developed through
coordination and collaboration with all government
departments and agencies that have responsibility for
both foreign and domestic national security concerns.
This analysis reviews the development of three different NSSs: 2002, 2006, and 2010. These three were selected because they required the consideration of the
many complex issues of the post-September 11, 2001
(9/11) world and because they were developed at the
direction of two different Presidents representing two
different political parties, and with the detailed support of three different national security advisors and
associated National Security Council (NSC) staffs.
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HOW NATION-STATES CRAFT
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
DOCUMENTS
The word “strategy” is used in a variety of contexts.
There are business strategies, coaching strategies, financial strategies, and research strategies. . . . An organization develops a strategy based upon its mission
or goal, its vision of the future, an understanding of
the organization’s place in the future, and an assessment of the alternatives available to it, given scarce
resources. . . . Development of a coherent strategy is
absolutely essential to national security in times of
both war and peace.1
—Mackubin Thomas Owens
The basic principles of strategy are so simple that a
child may understand them. But to determine their
proper application to a given situation requires the
hardest kind of work.2
—Dwight D. Eisenhower

INTRODUCTION
The need for security and the institutionalization
of that security in national strategy and its associated documents is becoming a significant concern
for nations in the 21st century international system.
This need requires the development of national-level
strategies that are designed with objectives that, if attained, can ensure the conditions necessary for security for a given actor in the international system can
be met. Nations have always had a variety of strategies that were intended for use at the strategic or na-
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tional level of government. That does not mean that
they were either “good” or “bad” strategies or that
they were in place at the right time for the right event.
But they did frequently exist in one form or another.
Most of these strategies existed in formal documents
that were classified and not open to public scrutiny.
More often than not, strategies that were focused on
national security related issues like the overall foreign and domestic security strategies for the nation,
as well as more specialized strategies like those designed to guide the nation’s military strategy, the development of the structure, roles, and missions for its
armed forces, or perhaps a specific strategy designed
for counterterrorism, were not set down in one definitive document. Rather, components of these types of
national strategies that were in place for nations that
functioned as democracies were either classified or, if
unclassified, typically found in senior leader speeches,
testimony before legislative branches of government,
or in interviews or press conferences provided to the
media. Recent years have witnessed the emergence of
a spectrum of comprehensive national security strategy related documents that have been created, in part,
to institutionalize the existence of national-level direction for a variety of national security issues and to do
this at the unclassified level for the public audience of
those democratic nations, as well as in some cases for
external audiences.
There are several purposes for placing these national security strategies within the public domain:
1. They serve as a broad construct for government
departments or ministries (as well as legislative and
judicial bodies), to ensure that they understand the
intent (approach or direction) that the elected senior
leadership desires in selected national security areas.3
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In essence, a national security-related strategy can be
“a unifying document for the executive branch (of
a democratic government) . . . designed to create an
internal consensus on foreign, defense, diplomatic
. . . economic, (and homeland security) strategy.”4
2. These strategies can function to inform the legislative body within a democracy (e.g., Parliament, Congress) on the resource requirements for the strategy in
question, and “thus facilitate the (fiscal) authorization
and appropriation processes.”5
3. The documents have the ability to be a strategic
communications tool for both domestic and foreign
audiences. These audiences include the domestic constituents of a democratic state—those that are considered key to the election of a party in power such as
lobbying groups or unions. It could also be directed at
other actors in the international system, such as other
nation-states or entities that are potential threats that
are considered to be significant to the state developing the document. All of these audiences may change
over time, depending on the issues faced by the crafting state during the course of the writing.6
The intent of this monograph is to explore the actual processes that nation-states employ to craft their national security strategy related documents. It is what
Alexander George, the famed Stanford academic, calls
process theory, the analysis of how to structure and
manage the policymaking process.7 For the policymaking (or strategy making) process to have its greatest chance for success, George found that it should be
able to: 1) Ensure sufficient information is available
and analyzed adequately; 2) Facilitate the identification of the policymaking actor’s major values and
interests, and ensure that the objectives are guided
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by those values and interests; 3) Assure that a wide
range of options, along with their inherent risks, are
considered prior to determining the ultimate course of
action; 4) Provide careful consideration of each course
of action option; and 5) Be willing to accept that the
policy (strategy) is not succeeding and learn from that
experience.8 In the case of this research, the focus is
specifically oriented on how to perform such analysis
for the development of national security strategies.
For each case study in question, this monograph
will include addressing the oversight (how and why
it was determined to create the document), strategic
context (identification of strategy stakeholders, legal
issues, determination of prior/current policies and
strategies), national interests and domestic political
considerations (how were national interests determined and what were the domestic political considerations for the assessed document), facts and assumptions used to frame strategy development (what
guidance was provided by the national leadership,
and determination of any constraints or restraints,
such as resource considerations like money or time
for the strategy, what threats and opportunities were
established for the strategy), objectives and measures
of effectiveness (how were the objectives identified
and measures of effectiveness for the strategy developed), ways (courses of action) and means (how were
the resources required to conduct the courses of action
established for the strategy), risk assessment (how
was risk assessed, such as political and monetary cost,
second and third order effects, along with the identification of potential spoilers to the strategy such as unanticipated actions that an opponent might take or the
occurrence of natural events like poor weather, and
modifications to the strategy that could be employed
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to address these spoilers), the identification of a formal feedback mechanism (created to formally review
progress of the strategy’s implementation on a regular
basis; intended to determine when and if adjustments
had to take place), and whom within the government
had the final approval authority for the document.
The content of the questions described above were
addressed to support the analysis of each of the identified case studies and originated with the U.S. Army
War College’s National Security Policy Program’s
(NSPP) Policy Formulation Model. Those questions
contained in the Model had been developed, expanded, and updated on an annual basis between 2004-11
by the students and faculty in each succeeding NSPP
class. The Model, with applicability for both policy
and strategy formulation, identifies a series of variables or directive steps to be addressed in the national
security policy or strategy formulation process. In effect, it was designed to serve as a detailed checklist
that could be employed for the crafting of any type
of national security-related policy or strategy.9 These
questions are intended to represent a comprehensive
listing of all questions that those charged with formulating policy and strategy would have to consider in
their analysis. Sequencing of the questions, the order
that they are engaged, is secondary to the concept
that they must be asked. Most important is that all the
questions were taken into account by the end of the
formulation process. Given the assumption that these
are the right questions to consider, then risk would be
taken by the actor doing the crafting in every instance
that the substance of the questions were either partially or fully not part of the strategy’s analytic process.
The risk could be manifested within the strategy by
issues such as less support within the government’s
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executive body and/or legislative body if the document is not fully coordinated. In turn, this could mean
that the resources may not be available to ensure that
the strategy can be fully implemented.
The monograph then aligned the questions to individual case studies of nation-states conducting their
national strategy document formulation processes.
These case studies were selected based upon a determination of two primary factors: 1) The nation-states
in question had developed national security strategy
documents that involved participation in the drafting
process from more than one department or agency
from the executive branch of government; and, 2)
Individual participants who were involved in the
actual drafting process would be willing to respond
to the questions delineated above, either in person
or by written response. In addition, subject to travel
resource availability, an effort was made to have as
many different regions of the world as possible represented in the review. Ultimately five countries and
their national strategy documents were selected for
assessment: Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the United
Kingdom (UK), and the United States. For each case,
at least one national strategy document was evaluated
per country, and more than one department or ministry from the government’s executive branch participated in each nation’s document drafting process.
Once the data were gathered, the author of the
monograph compared and contrasted the various processes employed by each nation in its strategy document development. This included the identification
of the separate components of the strategy formulation process utilized for each one of the assessed national strategy documents. Using the questions as the
common analytic tool, the cases were then evaluated
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in contrast to each other. The comparative analysis
demonstrated both the positive and negative impact
of how the formulation process questions were addressed in each case; or in some cases, not addressed
at all.
The last portion of the monograph evaluates the
lessons learned from all five cases and identifies specific lessons that could be applicable to strategy document formulation for any future actor engaged in the
process. These ranged from how to ensure maximum
agreement on the strategy among all relevant national security actors within the whole-of-government
framework, the most advantageous way to engage
civil society in the national strategy formulation process, and how best to identify national interests and
development of a sound risk assessment process, to
crafting valuable detail on the strategy’s ways and
means that could best be utilized by planners, direct
linkage of the national security strategy to a strategic
defense review type document, similar to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in the United States, and
the identification of potential spoilers to the strategy
and modifications that could be employed to adjust
the strategy accordingly. In the end, the key question
addressed was: was the strategy development process
as effective and efficient as it could have been? If the
crafting process was assessed to be flawed, it is likely
that the resulting strategy was also flawed in some
manner.10 The ultimate intent of this monograph is
to attempt to determine lessons from these case studies that will contribute to minimizing future national
security strategy developmental flaws for any nation
undertaking the development of these documents.
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WHAT IS NATIONAL SECURITY AND ITS
RELATED STRATEGY DOCUMENTS?
The concept of national security is directly related
to the notions of both security and nation or state, and
their relationship to each other. But writing in 1952,
Arnold Wolfers made it clear that the idea of national
security “may not mean the same thing to different
people.”11 In 2008, Ann Fitz-Gerald affirmed the same
view on differing definitions of national security in the
contemporary period when she stated that “national
security differs from country to country, and indeed
from institution to institution.”12 The reasons for these
varied interpretations are diverse. The two principal
explanations for the national differences lie with different perspectives on national interest. These different perspectives are largely inherent in the respective
strategic culture of each nation-state.
Security as a separate idea also has broad interpretation. The term itself points to a degree of protection
of acquired values, to include the absence of threats
to those values and the absence of fear that those values will be attacked. It is a value for which “a nation
can have more or less” and “aspire to have in greater
or lesser measure.”13 Walter Lippmann described the
measure for the attainment of security as: “A nation
is secure to the extent that it does not have to sacrifice its core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is
able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in
such a war.”14 That may have made sense at the time
of Lippmann’s writing in 1943, but for purposes of
this analysis, the concept of security will be measured
beyond the issue of war and the military instrument
of power. Over time, the idea of security within the
international system has broadened to reflect varying
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degrees of the union of national military and defense
related security with that of domestic/homeland security, as well as to ensure the inclusion of the state,
civil society, and the individual. In the 21st century,
the overall security concept is being looked at to encompass a “country’s society as a whole” and to include addressing transnational threats ranging widely
from energy security, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), and catastrophic natural
disasters to population growth, pandemic disease, climate change, and global poverty. 15
David Baldwin identified seven specific questions
for the analysis of the security concept: Security for
whom? Security for which values? How much security? From what threats? By what means? At what cost?
In what time period? In response to these questions,
security for a given nation could be characterized with
respect to how the nation’s values are to be secured,
the specific values being addressed, the degree of the
security to be attained, the kinds of threats that the security must direct itself to, the means for coping with
such threats, the costs for doing so, and the relevant
time period.16 The characteristics provided by the national answers to these questions will help determine
the real extent of a country’s perspective on what security will consist of for the nation in question. These
characteristics are likely to be significantly influenced
by how the state actors choose to define the concepts
of national interest and strategic culture on behalf of
the nation; in turn, this will lead to a determination of
how the state defines national security for itself.
A national interest is “that which is deemed by a
particular state (actor) to be a . . . desirable goal.” The
attainment of this goal is something that the identifying actor believes will have a positive impact on itself.
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Realization of the interest could enhance the political, economic, security, environmental, and/or moral
well-being of a populace and the state (actor) or national enterprise to which that populace belongs. This
holds true within the territory of the actor, as well as
in any external relations that the actor may undertake
outside of the administrative control of that actor. Interests are essential to establishing the objectives or
ends that serve as the goals for policy and strategy.
They help answer questions concerning why a policy
is important. National interests also help to determine
the types and amounts of the national power employed as the means to implement a designated policy
or strategy.
The concept of interest is not new to the 21st century international system. It has always been a fundamental consideration of every actor in the system.
They are what the actor values. These interests could
be designed purely for the sake of advancing the
power of an actor with the object of attaining greater
security for that actor, or they might be guided by values and ethics with the intent of doing some type of
good for parts of the international system, or the overall system in general. This might include collaboration
and coordination with other actors in the international
system. It could also require the interest-crafting actor
to subordinate certain interests that only benefit it for
the sake of other interests that are of greater value to
additional actors in the system. In addition, interests
are typically categorized and determined by intensity
or prioritization. Terms like survival, vital, critical,
major, serious, secondary, extremely important, important, less important, humanitarian, and peripheral
have been used to categorize interests in academic
writings and official government documents. Some
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categorize how significant the interest is in terms of
chronological relationship to the actor that determines
the interest (near-term versus longer-term impact),
while others relate categories to the intensity of the
substantive influence that the interest is determined to
have on the actor.17 All of these questions are directly
influenced by the strategic culture of the nation actor
in question.
Thomas Mahnken explains that strategic culture
“is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes
of behavior, derived from common experiences and
accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape
collective identity and relationships to other groups,
and which determine appropriate ends and means for
achieving security objectives.”18 The concepts of the
national interest and national security are framed by
the strategic culture associated with each of the five
national case studies being assessed in this monograph. Each of the national strategic cultures refers
to modes of thought and action with respect to force,
derived from perception of the national historical
experience, aspiration for self-characterization . . . and
from all of the many distinctively (national) experiences (of geography, political philosophy, of civic culture,
and ‘way of life’) that characterize a citizen from that
nation.19

“Geography and resources, history and experience,
and society and political structure” represent a nation’s strategic culture. Examples include the UK,
which as an island nation has traditionally favored
sea power and indirect strategies and avoided the
maintenance of large land forces,20 while “Australia’s
minimal geopolitical status, its continental rather than
maritime identity, and its formative military experiences have shaped its way of war.”21
11

The combination of national interests with strategic culture, and a country’s understanding of what its
security concerns should be, leads to the identification
of what the idea of national security will mean for an
individual nation-state member of the international
system. Some countries view their national security
on a global basis, others regionally, and a third group
focuses on their immediate borders and internal domestic security issues. Once determined, the next step
is the association of the terms “national” and “security” with the concept of strategy.
Strategy, different from policy, which answers
the question of what to do about something or why
something is to be done, is the response to the question of how to implement or execute the policy—it is
“how something is done.”22 It’s “a plan for deploying
capabilities to achieve policy objectives.”23 The U.S.
Department of Defense defines strategy as “a prudent
idea or set of ideas for employing (all) the instruments
of national power in a synchronized and integrated
fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”24 These ideas provide a structure for
a direction in the role of a guiding path through the
maze of international (and domestic) events, which
are, in turn, linked to ultimate objectives.25 Most importantly, strategy is a calculated or deliberate relationship between ends and means, intentions and capabilities, and power and purpose.26 It reconciles what
the actor crafting the strategy wants (objectives) with
the resources available (capabilities) to meet the wants
(attain the objectives).27 For nation-states, a national
strategy contributes to the country’s effort to “best
cause security for itself.”28
These strategies specifically designed to “cause security” come under the heading of national security
strategy. A nation’s national security strategy “rep12

resents a nation’s plan for the coordinated use of all
the instruments of state power—nonmilitary as well
as military—to pursue objectives that defend and
advance the national interest.”29 The term “national
security strategy” describes a “planned, systematic,
and rational process . . . shaped by strong leaders, organizational cultures, and governmental structures.”30
This process is intended to result in a country’s written “public, authoritative declaration about the manner in which it intends to achieve its security objectives within” both the international system and its
own domestic security environment. These are official
strategies that are written and published by governments.31 In fact, there are a number of different types
of formal strategy documents that address national
security issues within the international system, each
with its own descriptive name. The most well known
examples are labeled: national security strategy, white
paper, strategic defense review, and national defense
strategy. Of these, the most comprehensive one is typically described as the given nation’s “national security
strategy.”
A nation’s national security strategy can serve
a variety of purposes. Citing a number of different
sources, Sharon Caudle indicated that a successful national security strategy could provide the ability to:
communicate a detailed strategic vision of the current
and future security environment; communicate the
nation’s values; present a comprehensive analysis of
the range of threats to the homeland; consolidate the
government’s various national security related policies and strategies; present prioritized and measureable goals and objectives with timelines; identify the
international and domestic factors such as comparative capabilities, issues, and trends that will impact the
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attainment of security goals and objectives; develop a
whole-of-government approach to national security
policy and strategy making that encompasses all relevant departments and agencies; identify the courses of
action and resources (ways and means) to be utilized
to attain national objectives and provide guidance to
governmental departments and agencies for budgeting, planning, and organizing their responsibilities for
implementation of the national strategy; and serve as
a link between the strategy’s objectives and courses
of action designed to attain the objectives as a tool for
requesting resources.32
The ultimate value for a publically declared national security strategy is best determined by the true
intent of the originators. The key question that frames
the purpose for the drafters is whether the strategy is
primarily intended to be a realistic strategy that has
the ability to attain its ends with the available resources or, rather, is more of a strategic communications
tool that will declare the nation’s national security
focus for external international consumption as well
as justification for domestic governmental resourcing
requirements. The first formal American national security strategy (National Security Strategy of the United
States), drafted in 1987, was characterized as a useful
document that “brings together familiar statements
of American foreign and defense policies . . . it also
sets out . . . American interests and objectives . . . and
lists some of the threats to those interests.” But that
NSS was also described by the same commentator as
not having “set forth the priorities and choices which
are the essence of the strategy.” Such strategic fidelity could only be provided in a classified document.33
The result is that some national security documents
may be more useable for the whole-of-government
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national security community, depending upon the actual intent for the creation of the document.
One of the key features of national security strategies that provides value to subordinate policy and
strategy makers is the inclusion in the document of
that nation’s grand strategy, sometimes termed strategic vision. Grand strategy “is a conceptual framing that
describes how the world is, envisions how it ought to
be, and specifies a set of policies that can achieve that
ordering.”34 A grand strategy represents the “grand
design” and presents “the overall mosaic into which
the pieces of specific policy (and strategy) fit.”35 It is
the “unifying concept” that guides or directs all other
national security related policies.36 National policy
can only be established after over arching national
security aims and objectives have been identified. It
is the grand strategy that determines those aims and
objectives. Grand strategy becomes a function of the
“national intent” within the strategic environment.37
In hierarchical terms, grand strategy represents the
highest level or type of strategy.38 In the end, national
security strategy and other types of national-level
security-related strategies will serve to implement a
grand strategy.39
Additional types of national security-related strategy documents include what is termed a white paper.
A white paper is the title given to an “official government report in any of a number of countries (primarily
in the UK-led Commonwealth of Nations), including
Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada,
which sets out the government’s policy on a matter
(typically for a single functional vice regional policy
issue such as defense or counterterrorism).”40 Like
documents also include strategic defense reviews
(known in the United States as the QDR), which are
efforts to link national interests and courses of action
15

(ways) to support those interests with the military
resources required (forces, personnel, infrastructure,
and material) to ensure that the nation possesses the
military capability to ensure its security. It allows the
government to identify the strategic security environment that it will have to plan against. “The Review
looks at the type of force desired in the future and
helps to plan adequate resources to achieve it.”41 Other titles for these documents include national defense,
military, and counterterror strategies.
All of these national security documents in their
different shapes and sizes can be grouped into a hierarchy of sorts. There is a relationship amongst the
documents at each level of the national strategy formulation process: “the logic at each level is supposed
to govern the one below and serve the one above.”42 In
this case, the national security strategy with the inclusion of a nation’s grand strategy would serve as the
strategic standard for all subordinate national strategy
documents. “The other documents are, or should be,
logically related to if not derived from it.” The national
interests defined in the NSS would help to orchestrate
supporting functional security strategies. Australian
and UK strategic defense reviews and white papers
are in support of national security strategies, and the
U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the U.S.
National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the NSS.43
The single most important question to be addressed
is whether there is a “best” way to develop these documents. An associated question is the determination of
the amount of risk that the nation could be taking by
not employing certain approaches to national strategy
document development. For example, some argue that
the crafting of a national strategy is normally a “multidisciplinary and multiagency exercise.” If the strategy
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development process does not involve the participation of all the required government actors, then the
strategy itself is likely to be flawed. Following this
line of thinking, no single government department or
agency would be capable of mastering the contemporary security environment to the degree necessary to
craft national security strategy documents without the
active participation of other like government actors.44
Understanding the risk of crafting these documents in
one way or another may help determine the overall
ability of the final strategy to attain its objectives. As
examples, there is risk in utilizing a whole-of-government approach where every department and agency
has a say in the strategy’s development; the strategy
could be “watered down” with every agency’s concern being listed and no specific identified focus. In
the opposite vein, there is also risk associated in only
having a very small group of individuals work on the
documents, with only minimal whole-of-government
coordination taking place; because such an approach
lacks the assurance by the other governmental actors
that all the predetermined ways and means will be
available to attain the strategy’s objectives. In the end,
it is likely that the individuals who actually conducted
the national strategy drafting, in conjunction with the
government departments and agencies that they represented in the process, will be able to resolve whether
the strategy in question will prove its worth. The following pages will help assess whether the effort was
worth it.
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CASE STUDY: AUSTRALIA
The Australian government has never published a
whole-of-government-like national security strategy,
but there are a number of national strategy documents that delineate the country’s national strategy.
For this evaluation, they are the 2008 National Security
Statement (NSS) and the 2009 Defence White Paper: Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030
(WP).45 While the focus of the analysis will be on the
process utilized to develop the 2009 WP because it
provided the most significant whole-of-government
detailed strategic approach for an entire strategy development process and because “defence consumes
around 90% of all government funding for national
security,”46 the NSS document will also be addressed,
in part, because it was the first of its kind. The 2009
WP is considered the principal strategic document for
the nation because it provides an overall framework
that other national strategy documents can draw from
for their own foci.47 These defense white papers, essentially a combination of the NDS and the QDR, establish “the Government’s long-term strategic direction and commitments for defense as well as future
capability requirements.”48 Following a tradition of
“strategic basis” papers since 1953,49 the 2009 WP was
the fifth defense white paper to be published, with the
first taking place in 1976, and the last one occurring
in 2000, with updates in 2003 and 2005.50 The shift to
a broader whole-of-government perspective began after the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) and the
expanded emphasis on the threats of terrorism, failed
states, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.51 In addition to the actual WP itself, the
developmental process “included the commissioning
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of eight internal companion reviews, an intelligence
capability review . . . a defence procurement review,
together with a separate comprehensive audit of the
Defence budget.”52 The process involved the Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the National Security Committee of Cabinet, the Secretaries
Committee on National Security, as well as the primary drafting elements in the Department of Defence
(DoD).
The NSS, a first of its kind part of the Australian
national security formulation process, is not a strategy
but is rather designed to provide “a strategic framework to drive policy development in the various departments . . . with responsibilities for . . . national
security.” It was presented to Parliament in December 2008 in the form of a speech, rather than a written
document, by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and was intended to give the “context for the Defence White Paper, which will detail the way forward for . . . defence
over the next 20 years.” It also was designed to “inform a regular Foreign Policy Statement to the Parliament . . . shape the Counter-Terrorism White Paper
. . . guide the development of the Government’s first
National Energy Security Assessment . . . (and) incorporates the recommendation of the Homeland and
Border Security Review.” In essence, the NSS would
serve to connect the diverse elements of the Australian national security community into a coherent and
coordinated “whole.” The NSS also delineated the nation’s enduring national interests and ends, providing
specific direction for all national security related strategy documents, one of which was the 2009 WP.53
During the 2007 election, the Labor Party argued
that with the dynamic changes that had taken place
in the global security environment and the fact that
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no WP had been published since 2000, a new one was
essential for a new Labor government in office. Examples cited that described those changes included:
the events of 9/11 and the terror bombings in Bali,
London, Madrid, and Jakarta; wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq; the emerging risk of WMD transference to
threatening nonstate actors and Iran; and huge shifts
in the global distribution of power.54 Another part of
the Labor Party’s justification for the new WP was
also directed at their view of a need for greater discipline in the force development equipment acquisition process for the armed forces.55 Shortly after the
November 2007 election, newly elected Prime Minister Rudd directed the production for a new WP.
There is no legislative requirement for the crafting of
national security strategy related documents in Australia. Thus, the publication of the WP can be viewed
as the most politically effective way for a “new government to demonstrate its commitment” to address
emerging national security problems for Australia.56
A Labor Party Policy Document released just prior to
the 2007 election indicated that a “new defence white
paper will ensure that Australia’s defence capability
requirements are achievable and shaped by our longterm strategic priorities, rather than short-term political objectives.” A rigorous analysis of the connections
between strategic objectives, force planning, and capability priorities was promised, to include ending a
long time disconnect between strategic guidance and
force structure planning.57
After the 2007 election and owing to the changing
and uncertain strategic outlook for Australia and the
world, one of the earlier national security commitments made by the Rudd Government was to produce
a WP every 5 years. In the year before a new WP is
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developed, the government committed itself to produce “a strategic risk assessment, a comprehensive
force structure review, and an independent audit of
the Defence establishment to confirm the affordability of capability plans and make adjustments, should
circumstances dictate.”58 In essence, the Labor Government intends to institutionalize an overall review
of Australia’s national defense strategy on a regular
basis.
The Australian cabinet-based system of government has a singular advantage for the coordination
of strategy formulation. It is usually able to resolve
interagency disagreement at the Deputy Secretary
level because all officials in an Australian ministry below the level of the senior official in the ministry (the
Minister) are civil servants. There are no other political appointments below the level of that single most
senior individual. At the same time, those in the decisionmaking system must be sensitive to the current
political climate in order to be able to operate within
the senior level of the government’s political framework. The Prime Minister’s expectation is that coordination both within and external to departments is the
norm. While not working seamlessly, coordination
and collaboration have been institutionalized within
the Australian national-security related interagency
for at least 30 years. It is a relatively small community
and most civil servants know each other “quite well.”
If the civil servant does not coordinate, that individual
will not be in compliance with government policy and
will not be promoted. Success for a civil servant will
not be achieved in Canberra by conducting “one upmanship” against another department.59
The writing itself was led and conducted by the
DoD. The NSC staff concept is not a strong one in

21

Australia and this motivates the Prime Minister to look
to the department responsible for creating the strategy
to synchronize the whole-of-government effort. Mr.
Michael Pezullo, Deputy Secretary of Defence (counterpart for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
in the U.S. system) was the leader and lead author for
the DoD team that actually drafted the document. He
was assisted by two senior officials, Major General
John Cantwell and Ms. Maria Fernandez, individually
responsible for force structure, information technology, and human resource issues, and the eight internal companion reviews of defense organization. Approximately 100 career military officers and Defence
civil servants participated in the WP drafting effort,
“of which 30 were in the dedicated core drafting team
and the remainder spread across various Defence
agencies doing specific work on force structure issues
or the companion reviews.” The Minister of Defence
appointed his own three-person advisory panel of senior defense experts to act as his own sounding board.
During the drafting process, the panel met approximately every 6 weeks to advise the minister.
The National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC)
also met regularly at the ministerial level (equivalent
to the U.S. National Security Council [NSC]) in 2008 to
address the development of the WP, including a long
discussion early in the process on Australia’s strategic outlook. The NSC is the senior level Australian
“decisionmaking and coordinating body for national
security matters and consists of “the Prime Minister,
Deputy Prime Minister, the Treasurer, the Ministers
for Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the AttorneyGeneral.”60 In addition to the formal NSC meetings,
individual ministers met over the course of the year
to discuss specific elements of the WP. Prime Minister
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Rudd, his fellow NSC minister members, and the finance minister, Mr. Lindsay Tanner, were extensively
involved with the WP’s development throughout the
crafting process. The entire process began in December 2007 and lasted for 20 months until May 2009.61
Given the involvement of the senior Labor Party officials at the helm of the government and civil servant
leadership participating on the drafting team, the 2009
WP was a combined product of both top down and
bottom up approaches to the substance of the document.62
The members of the drafting team actually proposed the specific organizational structure for the WP
document. There has been a general core conceptual
structure for all prior WPs. This included addressing
the environment, relationships with other nations,
risks, trends, strategic interests, resulting tasks and
roles for the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and capabilities required by the ADF. A primary difference
between the five WPs is the emphasis placed on these
specific subject areas.63 As an example, the threat of
terrorism to the Australian homeland received more
emphasis in the 2009 WP than in the four previous
ones. This was as a result of events like the 9/11 attacks and the bombing of tourist resorts on the island
of Bali in 2002 and 2005.
The creation of a dedicated team from DoD to develop the document allowed for a synergy to be developed in the coordination process for the WP. The team
was able to obtain whatever support was required
from DoD because of the senior rank of Michael Pezullo; the Prime Minister expected him to operate
as a national level leader. He held weekly meetings
with the Defence Minister and received decisions on
a monthly basis from him. Pezullo also met regularly
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with the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG),
a U.S. Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) equivalent group consisting of senior level civil servants
from a variety of national security-related ministries
like Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and
the Attorney General. The SPCG then provided analysis and recommendations for WP issues to the Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS), a U.S.
Deputies-level equivalent body at the second tier of
government that is “the peak inter-departmental body
to advise [the] government on policy and expanded
operational matters.” It is chaired by the Secretary of
the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, has
strong National Security Advisor involvement and,
thus, has a great deal of influence.64 The SCNS had the
primary responsibility to ensure two-way feedback
for the whole-of-government coordination process between the drafting group and the senior government
decisionmaking bodies during the entire course of the
development of the WP.65
In addition, Pezzullo and his team had access to
the highest levels of the Australian Government to
receive guidance for the document. He could speak
directly to the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) if necessary because Pezullo reported directly to both the
DoD Secretary and to the CDF. The Service Chiefs
and the Vice CDF were Pezullo’s peers, and he could
deal directly with them. Finally, the Department of
Finance (equivalent of the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget) was brought in to work with the drafting
team from the very beginning of the process.66
Different from the WP, the NSS was primarily
drafted by one individual, Ms. Sarah Guise from the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, under the guidance of Angus Campbell, First Assistant
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Secretary, Office of National Security, and Duncan
Lewis, Deputy Secretary. The Statement was also
coordinated though the SPCG to ensure maximum
whole-of-government coordination; approximately
12 different departments and agencies were involved
in the process, to include the budgeting community
(Department of Treasury). NSS stakeholders included
both foreign and defense as well as homeland, border
security, and domestic economic actors, along with
the general public, which was more an audience than
a stakeholder because it was not consulted on the development of the NSS.67
The major stakeholders for the WP document were
the armed forces (both as an entity and any capabilities the forces acquire), the separate military services,
DFAT, and the Departments of Finance and Treasury (overall money affordability) for the budgetary
process.68 In particular, the two budget-associated
departments were very rigorous in their efforts to ensure that the military operated within its fiscal means.
Owing to the fact that the global financial crisis took
place in the middle of the WP drafting process, there
was an increasing need to ensure fiscal responsibility
for the WP. As a result, the WP directed the Strategic
Reform Program for Defence to save $20 billion from
the administrative/support components of DoD over
the next 10 years, which could be reinvested into new
capabilities.69 Regardless of whether a Coalition or
Labor government is in power, there has traditionally
not been any opposition to defense issues from Parliament. In reality, the Australian Parliament is not a
major stakeholder in the development of a DoD WP;
the government is elected to govern and there has
typically been a bipartisan approach to defense. In
the Australian political environment at the time, there
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was strong political pressure, and an expected electoral price to be paid if the government were unable
to fund WP execution. In the end, there was no major
parliamentary involvement in the development of the
2009 WP.70
Seeking recommendations, the NSS drafting effort
consulted up to as many as 12 different think tanks
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), like the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The drafters also
examined the national security strategy efforts of other nations, to include the United States, UK, Canada,
Singapore, and the Netherlands, to determine lessons
learned.71
It was determined to formally bring civil society
into the WP decisionmaking process at an early stage.
This was done to determine how much the Australian
people would be willing to spend on defense in the
form of fiscal resources because civil society is considered to be a key part of the Australian audience for the
WP.72 The Government sought the thinking of the population though the White Paper Community Consultation Program. It was “an extensive effort to engage
Australians from all walks of life, as well as defence
specialists, academics, business and industry representatives from State and Territory governments.” To
make this work, the WP Consultation Program panel
headed by Mr. Stephen Loosley, former Senator and
Parliamentary Chairman of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, widely
disseminated a 52-page paper that identified key
questions for civil society groups and individuals to
address. The three key questions were: “1.What role
should our armed forces play? 2. What kinds of armed
forces should we develop? and 3. Can we afford such
forces?” People were invited to contribute by attend-
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ing meetings that would be announced in their area
and/or submitting written input; 30 public meetings
and 35 private meetings were held in every state and
territory over the course of a 10-week period. Over
600 people attended the public meetings. The WP
Consultation Program panel also received 450 written
submissions. The Report’s Findings were released in
April 2009, in time to be utilized in the drafting of the
WP.73 It provided input from all sides of the spectrum
of society that reflected a broad range of the Australian people, both pro and con in terms of the strategy
and its fiscal resourcing component.74
The foreign audience was also considered very
important for the WP document because Australia
wanted to convey complete transparency to its regional neighbors. The intended outcome would be
that, with the strategy and force development results
of the process, the other regional powers would not
view Australia as a threat.75
Threat analysis was coordinated by the working
group director. He could request specific assessments
from separate intelligence community agencies, as
well as industry, as relevant.76
Australian strategic culture has been fairly consistent since the first WPs and strategic assessments were
crafted in the mid 1970s. There is continuity between
the five identified national interests in the 2000 WP and
the four interests in the 2009 document. Security of the
homeland remained the principal national interest in
all WPs. The primary national interest changes for the
2009 WP relate to a desire to develop and maintain
an expeditionary posture for the armed forces as well
as a continental posture for the Australian continent.77
At the same time, the NSS indicated “that Australia’s
national security interests are more complex and less
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predictable than in the past . . . international and domestic security issues intertwine.”78 When determining Australian national interests, both what they were
and their levels of importance in relation to each other,
those doing the evaluation found that the importance
of any national interest for the WP increased in direct
proportion to geography, based upon potential identified missions for the nation’s armed forces. There has
always been tension for Australia between geography
and alliance engagement and between regional priorities and global interests.79 In describing the detailed
analysis of the approach from an Australian perspective to determine how to define the nation’s national
interests, three key national security variables were
identified that should be included in the determination: geography related to the location of potential
threats and opportunities for Australian security,
risk involving the significance of what instruments
of national power would be employed to address or
not address those same threats and opportunities,
and policy concerning how and in what quantity the
country chooses to contribute to the international system: having Australia doing its share in the lead or
as a contributor within the international community,
in peace or conflict. This last national security interest related to how Australia viewed itself as a “good
citizen” of the world community in relation to its role
in the world and its willingness to support “purposes
beyond ourselves.”80 Australian strategic culture dictates that unless countries in the developed world, like
Australia, address what they term “disfunctionality”
in the international system, then “bad” things like the
spread of terrorism will take place.81
In descending order of interest, the closer geographically to a potential area of a required military
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operation, the greater the importance of the interest to
the nation. Thus, the closer the threat challenge or the
opportunity, the greater the importance of the interest. In the Australian case by level of national interest,
there was assessed to be more importance for a national interest associated with the defense of the Australian continent than the need to ensure local regional
stability in the South Pacific, followed by stability in
the Western Pacific and Eastern Indian Ocean area (relations with China could fall into this category). The
last and least important national interest considered
for security, was what was termed “broader area operations;” where the entire spectrum of force might be
applied on a global basis somewhere in the world in
support of a multinational operation.82 For the ends of
the strategy, it was agreed to develop a strategically
effective course that that could meet the WP’s minimum established needs.83
The WP’s detailed ways and operational means
were formulated at a classified level and placed in a
separate classified document.84 Much of the ways and
means analysis was done through addressing the individual scenarios in a wargaming process designed
to evaluate their capacity for actual execution. The intent was to test the military’s capability to perform in
each scenario.85
At the beginning of the strategy development
process, the WP was considered to be resource unconstrained. However, the coming of the 2008 global
financial crisis changed that approach, and a decision
was made to concurrently address fiscal resource
means.86 For the means of the WP, the 2009 document
was crafted for long-term implementation, to include
a funding planning horizon out to 2030, 21 years into
the future; far longer than its four WP predecessors.
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In principle, the government pledged funding for the
execution for the ways contained in the WP, extending for the entire 21-year period. No prior Australian
Government had prepared detailed financial defense
plans beyond a 10-year horizon.87 “The government
has committed to sustainable funding arrangements
for the defence budget for future years to provide
certainty for planning . . . to meet the growing cost
of military equipment.”88 The assumption is that the
fiscal resources will be in place for WP implementation; the document was written in consonance with
the resource planning effort. Development of the NSS
was also resource constrained, “consistent with the
government’s fiscal strategy and . . . budget rules.”89
The NSS did include addressing threats to the nation, but there was no identification of the threats or
risks of the threats in terms of prioritization (most or
least important). One informal analysis was made
of the number of citations in the NSS that addressed
challenges or threats. It indicated that terrorism and
violent extremism were cited 27 times as the most
discussed threat or risk, and drugs, arms, and trafficking were only addressed once in the document.
In between the two risk subject areas were 18 other
related issues, with 9 citations for the highest to 1 for
the lowest that could be defined as threat risks to Australia.90 Clearly, the evaluation of risk and its associated threats in the NSS indicated that this part of the
assessment remained immature.
A highly classified risk assessment was conducted
for the WP. This was the first one conducted for any
WP. For the first time with the 2009 document, the Australian government utilized a coherent and coordinated whole-of-government approach to risk evaluation
for a WP.91 Risk analysis for the strategy was found to
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still be an art and not a science.92 The Australian Government developed a Strategic Risk Assessment (SRA)
methodology that assesses potential risks, probability,
seriousness, and consequence. It is designed to assess
for priorities and differentiate between force structure
options. There were four components to the risk management framework: 1) Risk Context (strategic outlook, policy goals and objectives, and an assessment
of the Government’s tolerance for risk against the risk
being evaluated; 2) Risk Assessment (risk identification, analysis—the likelihood and consequences of the
risk, and evaluation); 3) Risk Treatment (identify measures to reduce risk and the consequences of the risk
by lessening the likelihood of an event occurring); and
4) Risk Review (addressing residual risk and regularly
monitoring and reviewing risk).93
The Australian DoD conducted a formal series of
workshops during July 7-18, 2008, that performed a
risk analysis focusing on the likelihood (from almost
certain to occur once a year or more frequently to very
rare/almost incredible to occur only once in 1,000 or
10,000 years) and consequences of risk (ranging from
a high of catastrophic to a low of minor) in support
of the 2009 WP. Likelihood was based on intelligence
assessments. The consequence assessment was based
on policy, intelligence, and consequence management
input for the “development, maintenance, and management of critical national systems, infrastructure,
or capability.” Most critical was the impact of the risk
events being evaluated. Based on the outcome of the
workshops, modifiers or “risk treatment” for the WP
were developed in the August-September 2008 period.
They were assessed in terms of implications for force
structure, force posture, and international defense
relationships.94
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The risk assessment evaluated a range of both
potential external conventional conflicts, regardless
of likelihood, such as between the United States and
China, and domestic issues like disaster relief. Risk
profiles were created by type of risk and the associated force and its operational posture. Part of the risk
analysis involved a review of potential spoilers to the
WP strategy. The working group performed the potential spoiler assessment by reviewing possible scenarios such as the impact of Pakistan devolving into
a failed state, if the monarchy fell in Saudi Arabia, as
well as if there were a lack of fiscal resources or if for
some reason the political will of the Australian people
had been diminished or changed. Based upon those
spoiler scenarios that were reviewed, a series of war
games was held to review the scenarios and determine what types of modifying ways and means could
be employed to influence the spoilers in relation to the
originally proposed WP strategy. These contingent
spoilers and modifiers were then set down in the classified risk assessment for the WP.95
At the conclusion of the strategy formulation
process and after the government had completed
formal coordination and approved the final document, implementation for both the NSS and the WP
were reviewed on a quarterly basis each year by the
Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
This was accomplished by their analysis of a spreadsheet submission made by the DoD of its evaluation
of progress being made towards WP supporting objectives or “targets” contained in each of the document’s chapters; it included the identification of lead
and supporting agencies and proposed timelines for
strategy implementation. The cabinet implementation
unit of the Department of the Prime Minister and the
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Cabinet did quarterly reviews to track implementation of key government commitments, to include that
of the 2009 WP. The review process for the NSS was
a bit different—instead, some of the major elements
were split out and reported on individually, including by the Department of the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet. The quarterly review process of government
approved national-level policies and strategies had a
long time tradition within the Australian government.
Each department has been required to submit its assessment of the progress or lack thereof being made
of the policies and strategies that it was responsible
for, especially in light of how it was doing to meet the
electoral commitments made by newly elected governments.96
In addition to the quarterly review process that
the Australian government has developed to continuously review the 2009 WP, the DoD also published a
document in 2010 that lays out the Australian Government’s approach to the major components of strategy
formulation as it relates to individual government
strategies, to specifically include the NSS and the WP.
Titled The Strategy Framework 2010, it is intended for
three audiences: senior DoD decisionmakers, DoD
staff that use or prepare the documents that this publication addresses, and any other interested parties
in the overall government that want to understand
the DoD approach and how it aligns itself within the
government for strategic guidance. Replacing the
last Strategy Framework edition published in 2006,
the 2010 edition lays out the process that the government uses “to synchronize the formulation of strategic
guidance, strategic planning for operations, international engagement, preparedness management, and
capability development. It aims to guide planners to
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create strategic-level documents that are congruent,
coherent, and comprehensive.”97
The Australian approach to national strategy formulation as demonstrated by the developmental processes utilized for the 2008 NSS and the 2009 WP indicates a clear focus on crafting whole-of-government
coordinated documents. Participating actors would be
found to be negligent if they did not coordinate. The
government utilizes a well institutionalized approach
that ensures consistent participation on the part of all
interested departments and agencies of the Australian
national security community. The formulation process
also emphasizes inclusion of the managers who control the fiscal means at every step of decisionmaking
for these efforts. In addition, the risk analysis concept
is becoming fully institutionalized.98 Finally, a wide
spectrum of Australian civil society was formally solicited for its thinking on the major issues confronting the 2008 WP drafters. In the end, the Australian
government has crafted a very sophisticated approach
to the development of national security strategy
documents.
CASE STUDY: BRAZIL
Although the armed forces have wanted it since
the end of World War II, the 2008 National Strategy of
Defense (NSD) is the first ever national level national
security-related strategy published by the Brazilian
government.99 This document was intended to serve
as the implementing strategy for the National Defense
Policy published in June 2005. The decision to craft the
national defense strategy was catalyzed by two primary factors: the perception that Brazil was having an
increasing influence on the world stage, and the gov-
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ernment’s belief that that a gap existed in the part of
Brazilian legislation that governed the direction of the
armed forces. 100 There was also a desire to engage Brazilian society through the NSD to obtain their support
for the armed forces and, thus, ensure that they were
a part of any defense strategy-related decisions to be
made within the democratic process. This promotion
of the relationship between the society and the armed
forces is intended, in part, to ensure that the composition of the armed forces reflects the makeup of the current Brazilian society, thus making it a reflection of the
Brazilian nation as a whole thru mandatory military
service.101
The actual decision to create a national strategy of
defense was codified in a National Decree by President Lula da Silva on September 6, 2007, which established a Ministerial Committee to “design the National Strategy of Defense” for the next 10-15 years.
The Ministerial Committee was chaired by Minister of
Defense (MOD) Nelson Jobim and coordinated with
Minister-in-Chief of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (the planning ministry for the entire government)
Mangabeira Unger. These two ministers, in conjunction with President Lula da Silva determined the primary contents of the document. The Ministers of the
Planning, Budget, and Management Ministry, Finance
Ministry, and Science and Technology Ministry were
also involved, as were the commanders of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force. While the NSD was intended to
be inclusive by the government, there was a perception that other Ministries were not so involved in the
document’s contents.102
For the Ministerial Committee, while the MOD
had overall responsibility for the document’s development, Minister Unger and the Strategic Affairs
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Ministry were initially responsible for directing the
document’s drafting effort and ensuring coordination
with all other involved government actors. The Ministerial Committee received little or no guidance for
the document at the beginning from any senior leaders. No constraints were imposed on what the finished
product should look like.103 The Ministry’s Defense
Advisory Division, consisting of two active officers
from each of the three services, along with one retired
Army colonel and a civilian professor, conducted the
actual writing of the NSD’s first draft. Work began in
the September/October 2007 timeframe and continued until the NSD was approved in December 2008.104
The Ministerial Committee had many meetings
with the three services and traveled around the country to visit numerous military bases to meet with each
of the seven 4-star general regional commanders of
the Brazilian Army, as well as to naval units, defense
education facilities, and research and development
centers.105 In addition, roughly 10-20 academics were
consulted on the document. While all were heard, the
three services contributed the greatest amount of input, by far, for the document.106 The Ministerial Committee also consulted with experts from outside the
government, to include “various public and private
agencies, as well as knowledgeable citizens in the area
of defense.” This included think tanks, retired military
officers, and former ministers of the services.107 There
was discussion about the potential to bring in the general society’s public audience, but it was decided that
it would unreasonably lengthen the drafting process
and, thus, there was no conscious attempt to engage
with that component of civil society as an entity for
input for the document. Towards the later part of the
document’s development, the Ministerial Committee
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also consulted with the Defense Front in Parliament
(an informal grouping of parliamentary committees
that had an interest in national security), particularly
the Permanent Commission on Defense and Foreign
Affairs.108 In the end, if there was disagreement within
the Working Group, the group ultimately reached a
consensus in dialogue with the MOD and the nation’s
senior leadership.109 President Lula da Silva presented
the NSD recommendations for approval to the National Security Council (NSC).110
Later in the process, a Working Group was established that consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces. This Working
Group consisted of about eight general officers and 30
officers at the rank of colonel or navy captain. While
the other three ministries were not represented on the
Working Group, they were able to review and comment on the NSD drafts. The Working Group began its
work in the April/May 2008 timeframe after receiving
the Ministerial Committee’s first draft, and completed
its draft in June 2008. This second draft was then transmitted back to the Ministerial Committee.111 Minister
Unger had a continuous dialogue with the services,
which resulted in numerous adjustments to the various drafts of the document. Some of the changes resulted in change to verbiage, but not necessarily to the
ideas that Minister Unger wanted to convey; they remained in the Strategy. This included continuation of
the draft as a demonstration that all classes of society
would be committed to the security of the nation. Both
the Defense and Strategic Affairs Ministers personally worked on the final document. When there was
disagreement that would not permit compromise, the
MOD position prevailed. Once complete, a last draft
was transmitted to the chiefs of the Armed Forces for
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formal approval; they were given 24 hours for any
last comments since they had been involved through
their staffs in the entire drafting process from the very
beginning. The draft then went to the President who
convened the National Defense Council (NDC) with
senior representatives from all involved ministries in
attendance. This represented the first meeting of the
NDC ever conducted. The NDC issued a decree supporting the document and forwarded it to the Parliament, also known as the National Congress, for final
approval. It was actually the 35th draft of the document that was published.112
The NSD is oriented on the development of medium- to long-term actions along three key axes:
“reorganization of the armed forces, restructuring of
the Brazilian defense industry, and management of
personnel in the armed forces.” There are three additionally associated defense sectors that are addressed:
cyber, space, and nuclear.113 All had to be addressed
within the context of the 2005 National Defense Policy.
The NSD also had to ensure that there were no contradictions with, and must be in support of, the 20042007 Brazil for All Plan.114 Approved by the Brazilian
Congress in August 2003, it established overarching
development objectives for the nation to include social inclusion and reduction of social inequalities,
environmentally-sustainable economic growth generating employment and income and reducing regional
inequalities, and promotion and expansion of citizen
empowerment and strengthening of democracy.115 In
addition to other Brazilian strategic documents, as
part of their preparation, the drafters also reviewed
the national strategy documents of other countries,
to include U.S., French, and German national strategies.116 Historically, the national interests were orient-
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ed on the former antagonisms in the south. But it was
recognized that in the 21st century, there are other issues of greater import to the Brazilian people.117 The
national interests that were identified for the NSD
came directly from the Objectives of National Defense
as addressed in the National Defense Policy of 2005. The
origin of the 2005 document’s interests came from the
1988 Federal Constitution and its subsequent amendments.118 These interests represented a combination of
internal components for Brazilian society like sovereignty, territorial integrity, and “preservation of the
cohesion and national unit” of the Brazilian populace,
as well as external interests of regional stability, the
contribution for the maintenance of peace and the international system, and a broader insertion of Brazil
into international decisionmaking processes.119 The
principle of noninterference with other countries was
also to be codified as a guiding interest.120 None of
these were specifically listed as national interests in
the NSD, but all those directly involved in the drafting process that were interviewed for this monograph
confirmed that the national defense objectives from the
2005 document represented the national interests that
guided the 2008 NSD. The intent behind the utilization of those interests was to affirm “the commitment
of every Brazilian citizen, both civilian and military,
to the . . . virtues of sovereignty, heritage, and territorial and national unit integrity, within a wide framework of democratic fullness and of total respect to our
neighbors.” None of the interests were prioritized; all
were considered to have had “the same degree of importance for defense.”121
For assumptions and facts that were employed by
the NSD drafting group, formulation of the NSD was
not constrained by any limitation on fiscal resources.
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It was intended to be a resource unconstrained strategy. It was felt that the society would be convinced
to provide the fiscal resources necessary to implement
the NSD after publication.122 The identifiable threats
were developed under the direction of Minister Unger
and ranged from the lack of societal participation in
matters of national defense and budget insufficiency
to the obsolescence of military equipment and the restrictions on technology transfer placed on Brazil by
more advanced countries.123
The ends or objectives for the NSD were derived
directly from the national interests (Objectives of National Defense) that were contained in the 2005 national policy document.124 In essence, the national interests
became the ends for the strategy. It was very important for the drafters to take into account the flexibility
and adaptability of Brazilian culture, and a sense of
people doing the best for the country, when determining the interests that would establish the objectives for
the NSD.125 For the NSD, the real origin of these ends
began with the 1988 Federal Constitution, which in turn
directly influenced the Objectives of National Defense
contained in the 2005 National Defense Policy. In addition, other less formal guidance to the drafting group
was found in senior level speeches on foreign and defense policy. It was a combination of the data found in
the both the formal documents and less formal guidance associated with the speeches that led to the final
acceptance of the Objectives of National Defense and
the Guidelines chapters in the National Defense Policy
document as representing the strategic ends for the
NSD. The Guidelines chapter contains 26 national security related focused objectives that could be considered supporting objectives for the ends found in the
Objectives of National Defense chapter. There were
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no measures of effectiveness developed for any of the
strategy’s objectives. In part, this could be because
so many of the objectives—like maintenance of the
nation’s sovereignty and heritage and sustaining its
territorial integrity—are long-term permanent goals
with no real end in sight.126
The armed forces do utilize measures of effectiveness for the implementation component of the NSD.
These were derived by utilizing the Balanced Scorecard Performance Measurement System developed
by Drs. Robert Kaplan and David Norton for the Balanced Scorecard Institute headquartered in the United
States (Cary, North Carolina). “Leading and lagging
measures are identified, expected targets and thresholds are established, and baseline and benchmarking
data is developed.”127 This performance measurement
system was obtained from the American Armed Forces by Brazilian officers during travel to Washington,
DC, in 2005. In the case of this strategy, the focus is on
the objectives established for the individual services.
One example was the establishment of an office on the
Army Staff (Strategic Follow Up Section in the Policy
and Strategy Directorate) to orchestrate the measures
of effectiveness for Army supporting objectives connected to the designated ways and means in the Implementation Measures portion of the NSD. This office conducts an assessment of the difference between
what the Strategy designates as objectives and what
can be resourced to attain the objectives.128
The strategy’s ways and means were developed for
inclusion into the Implementation Measures section of
the NSD. Some of the detailed ways and means came
from service military planning documents, some of
which were classified. The section included detailed
delineation of guidance for the actors (departments
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and agencies) that will be required to implement the
strategy, such as direction to the three services of the
armed forces that they must develop three sets of plans
for detailed force structure development, with established goals for the short term (up to 2014), mid-term
(from 2015-22), and the long-term (from 2023-30).129
Additional sections of the Implementation Measures
section originated with other ministries, like the Scientific and Technology and Defense Industry sections
from the Ministries of Science and Technology, Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade; all in addition
to the MOD and the services. Another such example
would be the Ministry of Interior for developmental
issues. These ministries were brought into the NSD
Implementation Measures development process on
an as needed basis for their expertise as the executing
ministry for a particular course of action (way), and
not for every issue.130
The detailed ways and means in the Implementation Measures section provided a real degree of fidelity for the ministries charged with implementing the
NSD. The content of this section was developed by
Minister Mangabeira and the Strategic Affairs Ministry. It was based upon a determination of both vulnerabilities and opportunities that could be employed
to address those vulnerabilities. This was exemplified
when the MOD insisted on maintaining the comment
describing the “obsolescence of most of the equipment
of the Armed Forces.” The MOD Working Group proposed eliminating the comment drafted by the Ministerial Committee. Minister Jobim overruled the comment’s elimination because he believed that he could
employ it in the final document to justify increases
to the defense portion of the national budget.131 Each
executing ministry was identified by the issue it was
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responsible for, along with the provision of suspense
dates indicating when implementation planning documents in direct support of the NSD were required
to be complete.132 This section actually provided the
planners located in the associated ministries with the
information necessary to begin the execution of the
tasks established by the NSD. The details made the
Implementation Measures section absolutely critical
to the success of the Strategy and, in turn, represented
a major contribution to national strategy development
for the nation.
Some select risk assessment did take place in the
development of the NSD. This was the case with the
proposal to commit 2.5 percent of the gross national
product (GNP) to future defense spending. Such an
increased fiscal commitment would greatly speed the
modernization of the armed forces. However, it was
assessed that the risk to other parts of the economy
was simply too great to permit such a redirected outlay of fiscal resources. In the end, the proposal did not
go forward to the nation’s senior leadership for consideration because of the risk assessment.133
After the MOD and the Minister of the Secretary
of Strategic Affairs came to agreement on the NSD,
they forwarded the document to the President for his
approval. The President then met with the members
of the National Defense Council to obtain their views,
which resulted in agreement and formal presidential
approval on December 18, 2008.134
While there was no formal feedback mechanism
that described the status of the NSD when in an execution status, the drafting committee did develop the
Final Provisions annex to the NSD, which determined
additional planning documents to be developed based
upon the evolving implementation of the strategy.
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These were to be complementary to the strategy itself
and could require adjustment as the separate plans
were executed.135 As an example, in 2009, the MOD
directed the Army Staff to create an NSD implementation strategy for the Army.136 It was then codified in
the Complementary Defence Act No. 136, signed in
August 2010, that the NSD must be updated by the
MOD and submitted to the Parliament every 4 years.
In addition, the legislation further stated that a new
White Paper document, to be published in 2012 and
intended to complement the NSD, would elaborate in
detail on how the NSD would be implemented. Each
new presidential regime will be required to publish
this document in the second year of its administration.137
The Brazilian 2008 NSD represents the first national strategy of its kind in Latin America. In combination
with the 2005 National Defense Policy and the forthcoming White Paper, Brazil is developing a systematic approach to the crafting of national strategy. Of particular note is the Implementation Measures component
of the NSD and the associated degree of fidelity with
the strategy’s ways and means. With the publication
of the strategy, this approach provides the ministries
and agencies responsible for strategy implementation
with the planning information necessary to begin detailed execution.
CASE STUDY: SOUTH AFRICA
The South African national strategy development
process was unique with respect to the other four case
studies because it primarily originated with the ending of the apartheid regime and the first truly democratic election in the history of the Republic. Conflict
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between the former regime and the African National
Congress (ANC)-led opposition was decades old by
the time that the first truly all inclusive elections were
held in April 1994. In effect, the new national strategy
and its associated drafting process was a product of
revolution. It was a new South Africa and with that
came the recognition that all issues associated with
defense and the South African armed forces would
have to change.138
The Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee of
Parliament on Defence (JSCPD) requested a new
budget for the armed forces shortly after the new
government was installed in mid 1994. In reviewing
the budget submission by the South African National
Defence Force (SANDF), which still had a senior leadership from the apartheid era, Parliament found the
submission oriented on a pre-1994 defense posture
and policy; it was a repetition of the past, focusing on
defense strategy and force structure and not addressing issues like civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, the racial and gender make
up of the force, language, and religious policy.139 The
JSCPD then informed the Minister of Defence that it
would not approve a new budget until a comprehensive defense policy review was conducted; this led to
the processes that resulted in the 1996 White Paper on
National Defence for the Republic of South Africa (White
Paper) and the follow on 1998 South Africa Defence
Review (Defence Review), designed to implement the
White Paper’s recommendations for the SANDF.140
While there had never been a comprehensive national
security strategy developed for South Africa that employed the strategic model used by the UK, there was
a history of white paper strategic documents going
back to the 1970s.141 The 1996 White Paper contains
the government’s grand strategy and defense policies.
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It “is concerned with countering military threats; with
the orientation, preparation, maintenance, and employment of armed forces; and with the procurement
of weaponry and military equipment.”142 In support
of the policy framework (“political guidance”) and
strategic direction established by the White Paper, the
Defence Review elaborated on the “policy framework
through comprehensive long-range planning on such
matters as posture, doctrine, force design (there were
4-5 options addressed), force levels, logistic support,
armaments, equipment, human resources and funding.”143
While the armed forces were focused on the definitions for its roles and missions, along with its force
structure and size for the new government, Parliament and the Minister of Defence (MOD) were far
more concerned with issues relating to governance
and management, with an orientation on civilian
oversight over the armed forces. This would include
the specific oversight that Parliament would be able
to maintain, accountability on the part of the armed
forces, transparency in all that they were responsible
for, and the creation of a new civilian Defence Secretariat (similar to a civilian staffed component of the
U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense144). As a result
of this orientation, both the White Paper and the Defence Review became products, in part, of these varied
demands as opposed to the result of a single requirement to craft a national defense strategy and develop
the force structure to execute it. Under the direction
of Committee chairs, initially Mr. Tony Yengeni, followed by Ms. Thandi Modise, the Parliament’s JSCPD
served in the role of the governing actor that would
ensure that all government demands were met by the
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documents. The JSCPD was created with an oversight
function over the armed forces because there was a
high level of mistrust by the new government from
the apartheid era for the SANDF in the immediate pre1994 period. The Committee was given the responsibility “to investigate and make recommendations regarding budget, functioning organizations, armament
policy, and state of preparedness of the SADF; and
to perform other functions relating to parliamentary
supervision of the armed forces as may be prescribed
by law.”145 After receiving what it considered to be
an inadequate proposed equipment acquisition strategy for the armed forces from the MOD, the JSCPD
also mandated a comprehensive review of national
defense requirements, resulting in the creation of the
new Defence Review.146
During the course of the formulation process and
after the MOD publically published a first draft of the
White Paper in June 1995 with an invitation to all South
African citizens to comment on it, the JSCPD received
over 90 written submissions and held three “consultative conferences” on the contents of the White Paper
before approving it.147 The Defence Review included
even more civil society participation than the White
Paper, and to ensure that all interested stakeholders in
the society were allowed input, three “national consultative conferences” were held between February 1996
and May 1997, and two rounds of regional workshops
were held in nine different provinces throughout the
country in both July 1996 and May 1997. The conferences and workshops were open to the public, with
attendance “by national and provincial parliamentarians, members of political parties and government
departments, and a broad cross section of the defense
establishment and civil society”148 (business, labor,
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clergy like the Catholic Bishops Conference, NGOs
such as Green Peace, and local community leadership149). The Defence Secretariat went to great lengths
to ensure that the public participated, including flying large numbers of civil society representatives (e.g.,
NGO directors and clergy and local community leaders) in aircraft to ensure that they could attend conferences and workshops.150 It was the inclusion of civil
society with the multiple workshops and conferences
over the course of drafting both documents that substantially lengthened the drafting process. But once
the JSCPD approved the documents, passage through
Parliament and Cabinet was fairly easy.151
At the beginning of the drafting and coordinating
process in the 1994-95 time frame, there was no real
integrated interagency-type system of governance in
the country. This did not come about until 1999. There
also was no NSC-type entity in place until 2000.152
Thus, for the actual drafting that took place during
this period, the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence had overall responsibility for the development
of both documents and “[both were] the manager[s]
of the processes leading to [their] formulation.” For
the Defence Review, a main Defence Review Working
Group appointed by the Minister of Defense and coordinated by the civil servants in the Secretariat for Defence, with sub-working groups or sub-committees,
was established and included MOD personnel (serving members of the armed forces), members (civilian)
of the new Defence Secretariat, SANDF personnel (a
colonel or Navy captain was provided to the main
Working Group by each of the uniformed services153),
Members of Parliament and, most interestingly, individual members of civil society organizations (CSOs),
to include the academic community and NGOs. The
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Working Group specialist sub-committees on “defence
posture, functions and force design, human resource
issues, Part Time Component (reserve force), the
arms industry, legal issues, and land and the environment.”154 In some key areas of the documents, the primary work was conducted within “security clusters”
with personnel from the MOD, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the intelligence community, and the police.
Although up to 40-50 people may have attended the
meetings as members of individual working groups,
only about eight of these individuals performed the
actual written drafting of the separate chapters in each
document.155
There was a hierarchy of outside involvement. In
what the MOD called “stakeholder consultation,” the
Defence Secretariat differentiated between “stakeholders” and “interest groups.” Stakeholders had an
“immediate material interest in the process and its
outcomes, (government departments, trade unions,
the military defence industry, parliament)” while interest groups had an interest but not a material stake
in the outcome (academics, NGOs, think tanks, and
other CSOs). This permitted the Working Group to
focus on attaining consensus with stakeholders, but
not necessarily with interest groups, although their
views were taken into account.156 While the MOD was
technically “in charge” as the responsible department
for developing the two strategies, the JSCPD and Parliament as a whole were definitely not going to be
“rubber stamps” as they constantly questioned and
reviewed the documents, and were responsible for approving the policy substance of the documents along
with the budget required to execute them. In fact, the
JSCPD was very active throughout the White Paper
development process and “insisted on ratifying the
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drafts line by line.” With Parliament’s final approval
with multi-party support, after the Cabinet had ratified the document, the MOD described the White Paper as representing a national consensus on defense
policy.157
A synthesis among all the participants in the drafting process took place over the course of 17 separate drafts of the White Paper. Issues that could not
be agreed to between the more traditional SANDF
uniformed personnel, all of whom had served in the
armed forces before 1994, and the civilians in the new
DoD, many of whom had served with or for the ANC
in support of majority black rule, were referred to the
JSCPD.158
Both approaches were designed to guide the future direction of the nation’s armed forces. But they
were also intended to inform neighboring countries
and regional organizations like the African Union
(AU) and the South Africa Development Community
(SADC), as well as the greater international community like the United Nations (UN), on South Africa’s
national security orientation. A key component was to
be the assurance that South Africa would not intimidate its neighbors. In addition, the documents communicated the changes in the missions of the nation’s
armed forces since the end of apartheid to civil society
as a whole. This included target audiences throughout
the breadth of South African society: the electorate,
the media, and separate civil society organizations.159
CSOs consisted of civil institutions like think tanks or
academic bodies that address issues such as human
rights, democracy, and governance; civil society engagement; small arms and light weapons; peacekeeping and conflict resolution; anti-corruption; and terrorism and organized crime.160 The inclusion of South
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African civil society stemmed from an acknowledged
lack of expertise within the government in certain related areas, “as well as the perceived need to legitimize
the security architecture that (had been previously)
associated with repression and apartheid.”161 This was
in the tradition of the “Bush Conference,” which was
a gathering of the elders of a tribe. The elders have
the responsibility to listen to all members of the tribal
family and then bring the information to the attention
of the tribal chief. The tribal chief will then make a
decision. This was the role of the JCSPD and resulted
in the very strong tradition of ensuring that the voice
of the people is heard.162
The involvement of civil society was an especially
important component of the audience for national security at this time in the nation’s history because the
concept of national security was changed by the end of
apartheid. In essence, (defense) policy was no longer
considered to only be the prerogative of the President
and MOD. In the post-apartheid South Africa, it had
also become the business of Parliament and the relevant CSOs.163 Their involvement significantly influenced the White Paper strategy to be structured for a
“primarily defensive orientation and posture . . . (that
was) reactive or strategically defensive.” This was a
significant change from the “proactive and strategically offensive strategy of the apartheid era.”164 Civil
society’s expanded participation in the development
processes also compelled the White Paper to emphasize “the importance of ensuring robust and stable
civil-military relations in a democracy,”165 another
very important change from what had taken place
during apartheid.
Identification of the national interests for the White
Paper was directly linked to the Preamble of the new
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South African Constitution that was approved in 1996.166
Domestically, the emphasis for the interests was on
the nation’s reconstruction and development program, while externally regional security became the
key interest. Taking direction from the Constitution,
domestically, the consolidation of the nation’s new
democratic political system, achievement of social justice, economic development, and a safe environment
to live in were the national interests with the highest
priorities. Externally, the highest interests were the
defense of the country and regional security.167 A key
external interest was confidence building with neighboring states to demonstrate that South Africa had neither the intent nor desire to intimidate them, and that
no preemptive operation against any of them would
ever take place.168 Most importantly, security would
no longer be viewed as primarily a military concept.
“The security of people and the non-military dimensions of security, (known as human security), have
gained prominence.”169 It would now have “political,
social, economic, and environmental dimensions.”
The concepts of “democracy, social justice, economic
development and environmental protection” were to
be considered more important for enduring security
than “large arsenals and standing armies.”170
The result of the analysis of national interests is that
a new security hierarchy had been developed for the
post-apartheid South African nation. In effect, defense
had become a subset of socio-economic development
policy. The nation’s Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP) became the highest component of
national policy, with defense policy taking a subordinate role. This approach had the added effect of iden-
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tifying the need to reallocate fiscal resources for the
RDP and curtailing military spending.171
Because of the higher prioritization of the domestic
interests, it was clear from the beginning of the drafting process that defense expenditures would have
to be reduced, necessitating a strategy that would be
resource constrained. The guidance received for the
drafting team from both Deputy Minister of Defence
Ronnie Kasrils and the JSCPD was that the White Paper
approach must be “needs driven but cost constrained”
for the guidance that would shape the SANDF’s future force design and structure.172
Rather than a traditional orientation on threats to
the state, the Defence Review strategy was based upon
a risk analysis. “The strategy was driven by defining
defence contingencies and their associated risks, and
(then) prioritizing (the strategy’s mission capability
requirements for the armed forces)” in relation to the
greater risks. The four principal resultant ends for the
capabilities of the armed forces were developed by the
risk analysis: self defense, regional security and peace
support operations, international obligations, and internal support to civil authorities. These became the
primary missions for the post-apartheid SANDF. Over
the course of the strategy crafting process, there were
93 different contingencies developed, with their concepts of operation (the strategy’s “ways”) for addressing the four primary missions. “These were evaluated
for effectiveness through war gaming techniques.”
Various force structure elements (means) were applied and assessed for each mission via the gaming.
The intensive gaming approach permitted the drafters
to optimize the Defence Review’s “ways and means
to ensure the greatest possible risk reduction within
various budgetary envelopes.” This approach allowed
final recommendations to be “made with full knowl53

edge of the risk that they entailed, as well as their cost
(budgetary) operations.”173
Some believe that while many concepts of operation and force design options were reviewed and war
gamed, the final strategy was based entirely on an assessment of the likely budget, which was then divided
up to give each service enough money “to prevent
squeals of outrage.” Thus the budget drove the national strategy rather than the strategy mandating the
budget. Likely defense missions over the near- to midterm were not taken into account. As a result, there is
a belief in some circles that the final force design was
not adequate to meet all identified contingencies, such
as peacekeeping operations.174
The analysis conducted in support of the Defence
Review did identify some potential strategy spoilers.
In particular, the determination of the importance of
the national interests combined with budgetary restrictions could place further constraints on defense
expenditures for the “short to medium-term” period
of the Defence Review’s existence. As a modification,
the DoD Offices of the Secretary of Defence, the Chief
of the SANDF, the chiefs of the Services and their
staffs are instructed to make required “short-term adaptations to ensure the maintenance of the required
capabilities and expertise within the financial allocation to defence.”175
A key weakness of the strategy was the lack of
much of the implementation process.
The Treasury simply declined to provide the necessary funding, and the Defence Force simply ignored
much of the DR—for instance closing down the Parachute Brigade and its only division-level headquarters
(HQ) within a year or so of those being set down as

54

part of the force design to be maintained, and doing so
with no reference at all to Parliament.176

Both the White Paper and Defence Review assisted
the nation in moving beyond the apartheid era. These
strategic documents allowed South Africa to enter the
20th century with a very different approach to the concept of national security than it had lived with in the
recent past. The documents provided a national-level
strategy for the defense establishment on its role in the
society writ large, as well as the approach in the form
of ways and means to execute that strategy with the
nation’s armed forces in the near- to mid-term. These
documents were guided in detail by the state’s legislative body and uniquely supported by the significant
inclusion of civil society throughout the course of
their development processes. Both of these contributions to national strategic development have made the
South African strategy document process unique and
worthy of additional analysis because of their applicability to other states and their associated approach to
strategy formulation.
CASE STUDY: UNITED KINGDOM
The first National Security Strategy of the United
Kingdom was published in March 2008. This publication was initially “stimulated by the U.S. example of
national security strategy development (and a wish on
the part of some British commentators to see a distinctive UK voice in security strategy)”177 and catalyzed by
discussions begun in 2006 by the UK think tank known
as DEMOS. All sides of the UK political spectrum supported this effort. The Conservative Party’s National
and International Security Policy Group also devel-
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oped a “national security approach” in the 2005-07
period, key elements of which were the creation of an
NSS.178 During this time, there was also some thought
being given within the government about the need for
an NSS.179 Speaking at the annual DEMOS security lecture in December 2006, Sir David Omand, former UK
Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet
Office, described the long-term and uncertain nature
of the 21st century threats, such as border security
for the sea, air, and space, as well as environmental
security issues that the UK would have to confront.
These types of challenges had eliminated the division between internal and external national securityrelated issues and would now have to be addressed in
a singular manner. The various governmental actors
responsible for these national security issues in the
UK would only be able to work together in a mutually
supporting manner if they were “guided by (an) understanding of the ‘Grand Strategy’ being followed.”
This grand strategy would contain the strategic “aim”
and “direction” for the nation, thus permitting the varied state actors to be led towards common objectives
in the foreign and domestic spheres of national security. The grand strategy in question would require the
development of a national security strategy. It would
be the development of such a national strategy that
would provide the government with the ability to anticipate rather than simply react to national security
challenges and opportunities.180
This speech was followed by the publication of a
DEMOS report in February 2007 that elaborated on
the need for a whole-of-government approach to an
NSS. Such a strategy would:
•	articulate a vision of the current and future
security environment;
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•	communicate Britain’s values in the 21st
century;
•	develop a framework for collaboration across
government on national security policy and
identify policy areas where departments and
agencies can be more efficient and effective in
working together;
•	prioritize national security policies and initiatives and the allocation of resources; and,
•	bring together the plethora of departmental
white papers on national and international security.181
An additional influence was the work of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), a think tank
that created an independent Commission on National
Security in the 21st Century. The Commission, chaired
by Lord George I. M. Robertson, a former Secretary
General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and UK Defense Secretary, authored its initial
report in October 2007, highlighting significant changes in the security landscape that the authors felt had
not been properly addressed by the government. They
included a power shift from Europe to Asia and the
Pacific, failed and failing states, climate change and
resource scarcity, and the rise of complex networked
societies.182
Articulation of strategic vision would be designed
for both government actors and the public at large.
There were already several government national security strategy-like documents in existence, such as
MOD Strategic Defense Reviews, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) international priorities, the
CONTEST counterterrorism strategy, and numerous
Home Office related publications. In fact, these minis-
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tries were believed to often have policies and missions
that were not integrated or, at least, not necessarily
mutually supporting, with the MOD focused on external defense, the FCO on external diplomacy, and the
Home Office (HO) oriented internally. The result was
frequently poor coordination and an inability to attain
policy objectives. The development of an NSS would
create the conditions for the promotion of greater synergy between national security related departments
and agencies, allowing for improved resource allocation and risk analysis. An NSS would also serve to create public confidence in the government’s approach
to national security so that the crafting process would
be better understood and transparent. Finally, an NSS
would influence the way national security resource allocation is managed, ensuring that that allocation was
aligned with risk prioritization.183
In part because the MOD strongly supported the
need for an NSS owing to the belief that no one in the
government was viewing security from the perspective of an overall whole-of-government approach,
partly because of the acceptance of the DEMOS speech
and report findings, and partly because the new administration of Labor Party Prime Minister Gordon
Brown wanted to signal that he was different from his
predecessor, Tony Blair, in reintroducing more formality into government processes, the newly installed
Labor government announced in June 2007 that an
NSS would be developed.184
What was to become the UK’s first of three wholeof-government NSSs was crafted between June 2007
and February 2008. The second (essentially an update), was published in June 2009, and the third NSS,
in conjunction with an updated Strategic Defence and
Security Review (SDSR), was published after the elec-
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tion by the incoming Conservative government in October 2010.185 The National Security Secretariat (akin
to the U.S. National Security Staff or what was previously known as the NSC Staff) component of the Cabinet Office under the auspices of the Secretary of the
Cabinet had the responsibility for leading the wholeof-government effort to draft these documents. The
National Security Secretariat was created, in part, in
line with recommendations made in another DEMOS
think tank report, this one first published in 2007.186
Because the 2008 document and ensuing process were
completely new, the Cabinet Office-led team had to
determine what the contents of the NSS would be. All
personnel who worked on the drafting of the documents were either career civil servants or serving military officers. An intergovernmental or interagency
whole-of-government committee with senior representatives from all relevant departments was formed.
The committee included personnel from the Cabinet
Office National Security Secretariat as the lead agent,
the MOD, FCO, HO, Department for International Development (DFID) (the department responsible for orchestrating the government’s foreign assistance similar to the U.S. Agency for International Development
[USAID]), and the intelligence agencies.187
Officials strongly wanted the 2008 document to
benefit from cross government coordination. This
would be the case with the participation of senior personnel from the major department ministries involved
as well as the two major political parties.188 At the same
time, the Prime Minister’s office via Mr. Matt Cavanagh, Special Advisor for Security to Prime Minister
(PM) Gordon Brown, became directly engaged with
the drafting process. The result was that there were
two separate and different approaches to the NSS.

59

One was embedded in the Cabinet Office with government career civil service bureaucrats and military officers, and the other with the Prime Minister’s special
(personal) advisors in 10 Downing Street approaching
the topic from a political perspective.189 Two separate
drafts emerged; each originating from one of the two
groups. It became the responsibility of the Cabinet Office, under the direction of Mr. William Nye and the
National Security Secretariat to merge the two. Within
that process, the MOD and FCO crafted their own
chapters in the 2008 NSS, with the FCO component
addressing foreign policy issues.190 The departments
were concerned that the creation of the NSS could lead
to some type of national security related policy prioritization and, as a result, were focused on protecting
their existing operational and financial commitments
by ensuring that the NSS gave a high priority, or at
least mentioned, any activity that they were responsible for.191 During the course of the development of the
2008 NSS, a political commitment was made by the
Labor Party in power, and supported by the Conservative Party opposition to create an NSS update. The
Cabinet Office National Security Secretariat would be
responsible for ensuring the updates were conducted,
as well as monitoring their implementation. This was
the origin of the 2009 and 2010 NSS documents.192
The 2009 NSS was essentially a reworking of the
2008 document and was designed to demonstrate what
had changed since the publication of the first NSS.193
This was conducted by the same Labor Party government that had drafted the first document. A significant
difference between the first two NSSs was that while
the respective ministries drafted their related sections
for the 2008 NSS, the 2009 NSS was written in its entirety by the Cabinet Office National Security Secretar-
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iat and coordinated closely with the ministries. Neither one of the first two strategies was designed to be
overly constrained by resources. These were intended
to be national strategies that were “resource blind.”194
In comparison with what was to become the 2010 NSS,
the 2008 and 2009 documents did not “force prioritization” of components of the strategy for policy emphasis, such as “the creation of a special relationship with
India or protecting the homeland” and there was no
clear link to resource allocation for the budget.195
Those crafting the 2010 NSS in the Cabinet Office
National Security Secretariat on behalf of the new Coalition (Conservative and Liberal Democrat Parties)
government were able to take advantage of the drafting experiences associated with the first two strategies.
The Conservative Party Board actually approved the
NSS concept prior to their election that year.196 This
NSS would be different for two primary reasons: the
NSS was written concurrently and intended to link directly with the first SDSR developed by the UK since
1998,197 and because the drafters employed a sophisticated risk analysis methodology for both the national
security strategy and the SDSR.198 This NSS, published
on October 18, 2010, was specifically designed to
establish the end state objectives for the SDSR, published on October 19, 2010, which identified the ways
and means of achieving these ends.199 The NSS could
be considered an aspiration document (aspiring for
objectives).200 It would set “the context for the SDSR
through which all instruments of national power are
brought together.”201 Both overarching documents
were intended to be supported by several supporting
strategies like the CONTEST counterterrorism, cyber,
and counterproliferation strategies. The ministries
charged with drafting the supporting strategies col-
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laborated during the crafting process202 so that they
would be mutually supporting.
The 2010 drafting process expanded the wholeof-government collaboration process, especially with
the participation from the outset of the ministries and
agencies representing the resource ways for the SDSR.
It included all of the new NSC government member
departments (FCO, Home Office, MOD, Department
of Energy and Climate Change [DECC]), and the Cabinet Office, in addition to the critical addition of the
Treasury (Her Majesty’s Treasury [HMT]), as well as
the DFID,203 and Departments of Transport and Communities (regional and local government).204 The Coalition Government also had the benefit of the final
IPPR Commission on National Security in the 21st
Century report which strongly recommended that
the “barriers between departmental” stovepipes be
broken down with the assistance of a strengthened
“strategic center of government.”205 Among the responsibilities for the new National Security Secretariat
created to support the NSC and new National Security Advisor position, was the requirement to ensure
that the departments develop well prepared papers
that present options for “collective decision and effective implementation.”206 This new formal mechanism
would be responsible for bringing “together all the
Departments of Government in the pursuit of national
objectives . . . (to) align national objectives . . . for strategic decisions about foreign affairs, security, defence,
and development.”207 Ten personnel from the national
security related departments were seconded to the
National Security Secretariat to ensure the ability for
real cross government coordination during the course
of the actual drafting process for both the NSS and the
SDSR.208
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The 2010 process “did deliver on integration (collaboration may be a more appropriate term at this
point because while the process did get different departments and agencies into the same room with each
other, these same departments and agencies were
providing their own separate submissions to the National Security Secretariat)209 and outcome because the
process enabled conversations to be had, decisions to
be made, and realities to be recognized.”210 As the two
documents were developed in parallel, there was a
consistency with the identification of the ends, ways,
and means.211 The participating ministries all were able
to review the various iterations of each as they were
being crafted.212 The ongoing review process came
about through a disciplined series of weekly meetings chaired by the National Security Advisor and
with all of the NSC ministerial Permanent Secretaries (U.S. Undersecretary-equivalent) in attendance.213
These meetings were always conducted a week in
advance of ministerial level meetings chaired by the
Prime Minister on the same topics.214 Of note, there
were only a handful of cabinet level meetings that addressed the 2008 and 2009 documents. External to all
government actors involved in the drafting process,
the government also consulted with think tanks and
private experts on a variety of issues, such as the dialogue created by the Office of Cyber Security “with a
number of nongovernment experts from across industry, universities, and (other) professional institutions
to help with the development of (the cyber component
of the strategies).”215
In fact, it appears that the SDSR rather than the NSS
was the primary focus of the 2010 national strategymaking cycle; thus emphasizing the ways and means
for this iteration of national strategy development.
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The draft versions of both documents were developed
in the June-September 2010 time frame by the National Security Secretariat and featured constant NSC discussion among relevant cabinet ministers on interests
and risk.216 The government wanted flexibility on how
it chose to define interests in terms of “hard vs. soft”
interests—the constant struggle for a state between the
national interests and the values of the state. In the UK
case, human security problems were discussed to determine where they fit in the prioritization for national
interests.217 There was a greater effort with this NSS
to include UK218 long-term national interests in consonance with the shorter near-term threats that had
evolved since the events of 9/11; thus, energy security
issues were identified in the same national interest
context as were terror and Afghanistan. To further the
discussion, in addition to the National Security Secretariat, the FCO and HCO also drafted papers proposing their view of national interests. With the employment of the new National Security Risk Assessment
(NSRA) methodology, prioritized risks actually were
used to identify and prioritize national interests—this
was case for both external and internally focused national interests.219
The ways and means appeared to be the primary
focus of the 2010 strategy developmental process.220
With specific reference to the resource means, both
the 2008 and 2009 NSSs were considered to be unconstrained by resources. But in 2010, in light of the impact of the global financial crisis,221 the Coalition Government made a conscious decision to align both the
NSS and the SDSR with the fiscal resources available
for strategy implementation. Based on the information
contained in the 2010 document, the related ministries
were directed to develop their own detailed budget-
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ing decisions to support the national strategy. Counterterrorism was prioritized and received lesser cuts
than any other programs addressed in the 2010 NSS.
222
The only area that received an increase in budget
was cyber security.223 Future acquisition commitments
were reduced in line with the available resources and
the aims contained in the NSS.224 In addition, the government’s Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR)
was conducted in 2010 and released the same month
that the NSS and SDSR were released. This document,
developed by HMT and signed by the department
head, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was intended
to be in direct alignment with the SDSR. To that end,
it fully funded the UK’s mission in Afghanistan and
supported specific national security areas such as cyber defense.225
A key addition to the two 2010 documents was
the application of the NSRA. The National Security
Secretariat, building on an original domestic-focused
National Risk Assessment,226 formally employed the
NSRA in conjunction with “subject matter experts, analysts, and intelligence specialists”227 across the government through a series of workshops228 to “compare(s),
assess(es) and prioritize(s) all major disruptive risks to
the UK’s national interest which are of sufficient scale
or impact . . . to require action from (the) government
and/or have an ideological, international, or political
dimension.”229 Risk assessment is not new to UK strategy formulation. It actually began with the analysis
of risk likelihood, vulnerability, and the impact of the
risk as described in the 2002 counterterror strategy,
as well as the domestic-oriented 2004 National Risk
Assessment, which “drew on the “Defence Planning
Assumptions” methodology developed in the 1990s.”
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The strategy was then focused on how to reduce the
likelihood of the risk becoming actualized.230
This 2010 assessment was conducted to address
risks over the next 5- and 20-year time periods. All
evaluated risks were viewed as potential threats or
challenges to the state and were identified in eight
broad categories: 1) terrorism, 2) state threats, 3) risk
of instability, 4) risk of disruption to flows of people
and supplies that were essential to the economy, 5)
risk to disruption of the flow of capital or information,
6) risk to the international system, 7) transnational organized crime, and 8) natural hazards. The likelihood
and impact of each risk was considered, as was the
economic cost, and impact on infrastructure and society, along with the impact of those risks on their ability to increase the likelihood of one or more other risks
taking place. The NSRA was considered so valuable to
the process that it was decided to formally update it
every 2 years.231
Potentially the most significant component of the
NSRA methodology was the assessment for the likelihood of these threats or challenges to emerge over the
two given time periods. While clearly subjective, the
evaluation was made based on four criteria: intent, capability, vulnerability, and historical evidence. These
variables were coupled with the will of actors to carry
out malicious or violent activity, the capacity of these
same actors to conduct these activities, the vulnerability of intended targets in the UK and UK interests
in the world, and any related historical data. The assessment then compared the outcomes by impact and
likelihood to each other, and developed a scoring system ranging from highly plausible to highly implausible concerning the likelihood of a given threat being
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carried out over the course of the next 5- or 20-year
periods.232
It was a subjective process that had limitations,
and the National Security Secretariat determined that
it had to give the Prime Minister, senior Ministers, and
other senior officials the opportunity to consider the
relative positioning of the risks; to ensure that they
were placed in a logical manner from their perspectives. The Secretariat found that it was not possible to
prioritize geographically, primarily because most of
the risks crossed or straddled geographic boundaries.
It proved difficult to differentiate between current activity and the likelihood for risks to mature over time.
It was also difficult to weigh one-time events like a
single terrorist attack against risks that manifest themselves over time or in several forms, such as the smuggling of drugs into the country.233
The employment of the NSRA and its ensuing findings permitted a structured discussion to take place
among UK officials on the risk impact of both domestic and international threats and challenges, leading
not only to a determination of risk but to identification
and prioritization of the related interests. Most importantly, the methodology presented a means for prioritizing risks that “represent the most pressing security
concerns in order to identify the actions and resources
needed to deliver . . . responses to those risks” in order
to mitigate their impact. The risks were prioritized in
three tiers: Tier One: those of highest priority in terms
of likelihood and impact (e.g., international terrorism
affecting the UK); Tier Two: next highest priority in
terms of likelihood and impact (e.g., attack on the UK
by another state or proxy using chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear weapons (CBRN); Tier Three:
third highest priority in terms of likelihood and im-
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pact (e.g., large scale conventional military attack on
the UK).234
All risks, regardless of tier ranking, were to be considered important and require government action “to
prevent or mitigate the risk.” In some cases, action is
taken to prevent a lower tier risk from rising to a higher tier, such as assistance to an area of potential instability before it becomes more unstable. In the end,
the prioritization of risks is conducted in order for a
strategy to prioritize capabilities needed to prevent or
mitigate those risks. The higher the risk, the greater
the effort needed for prevention or mitigation.235 This
effort tied to the risk evaluation is contained in the
National Security Tasks (NST) and Planning Guidelines found in the SDSR. The eight tasks and the more
detailed planning guidelines are intended to serve as
the ways needed to attain the objectives identified in
the NSS. They are designed to “drive detailed decisions by departments over the next five years on how
to prioritize resource allocation and capability development.”236
For the future, it was determined that the NSRA
would be updated every other year and the SDSR
would be developed every 5 years, with the next ones
scheduled for 2012 and 2015, respectively.237 The SDSR
is being reviewed every month or two for effectiveness.238 The relationship between the two documents
is a key advantage to the 2010 UK national strategy
development process, as the ends of the NSS are supported by the ways and means contained in the SDSR.
The fidelity of the ways, as identified in the SDSR
NST and Planning Guidelines, along with the Defense
Planning Assumptions (DPA), in their description
of the type, number, and intensity of military operations that the MOD has to be prepared to execute will
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provide a planner in the MOD the necessary detailed
guidance to plan for like missions.239
The evolution of the national strategy development
process since 2007 has been significant, especially
with the inclusion and alignment of the means (fiscal
resources in the budgeting process) and the utilization
of the NSRA in analysis of risks and related national
interests. This is especially true in the linkage between
the NSS and the SDSR, along with the connectivity
between the ends, ways, and means contained in the
two documents. While an excellent tool, one potential drawback of the formalized risk analysis process
contained in the NSRA is that the strategy’s ultimate
objectives may be framed more than they should be in
terms of risks and challenges, rather than opportunities. Thus, the focus could be on problem solving as
opposed to “goal seeking,” having the ultimate effect
of inhibiting strategic thinking.240
The system used to orchestrate the strategy development process has also evolved with the creation of
the NSC and the National Security Secretariat. At the
same time, the desire for a true whole-of-government
product is impacted by the cultures of the departments involved in the process as they influence strategy making. “Actors (sometimes) create cultures that
get in the way of a more coherent approach.” In the
end, virtually all participants continue to believe that
politics and institutional culture matter more than the
strategy development process. The good news is that
the participants also tend to believe that, where necessary, the process can be utilized to change (at least
part of) the political culture.241 The evidence is clear
for the UK that this type of change can occur, as demonstrated by the creation of new institutions under direction to make the final product one that is based on
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a true whole-of-government approach, as was the case
with both the 2010 NSS and 2010 SDSR.
CASE STUDY: UNITED STATES
The requirement for the United States to craft a
national security strategy (NSS) document was first
codified in the National Security Act of 1947, and
amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The 1986 amendment requires the President to submit the document
on an annual basis to Congress to provide a comprehensive report on U.S. national security strategy.
Both pieces of legislation mandate that the strategy
include a “comprehensive description and discussion of worldwide interests, goals, and objectives . . .
that are vital to the national security of the United
States.” It would also address foreign policy, worldwide military commitments, U.S. national defense capabilities, short- and long-term uses of the elements
of national power, and the requirement to have the
strategy transmitted to Congress in both a classified
and unclassified form.242 A number of national strategies were developed over time prior to the GoldwaterNichols legislation, to include what many believe was
the most significant grand strategy of the era, NSC68, the key containment strategy against Soviet and
Chinese communism. All were crafted during the preGoldwater-Nichols Act period at the classified level.243
There have been 15 NSSs published by five different administrations since the implementation of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act: 244
• Reagan (2nd Administration): 2 (1987/1988)
• Bush 41: 3 (1990/1991/1993)
•	Clinton: 7 (1994/1995/1996/1997/1998/1999/
2000)
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• Bush 43: 2 (2002/2006)
• Obama: 1 (2010)
Clearly there are some gaps during the 25-year period (between 1987-2012) for NSS publication, given
the understanding that the Goldwater-Nichols Act
stipulates that the NSS is to be provided to Congress
on an annual basis and that it is to be published during the first 150 days of any new administration. Some
observers believe that an annual requirement for an
NSS could be too frequent because a nation’s approach to national security is unlikely to completely
change every year.245 In addition, the requirement for
a new administration to develop an NSS within its
first 150 days, while many important political appointee national security related policy positions are still
being made and some are undergoing congressional
confirmation, is simply very difficult to execute. None
of the previous four administrations have been able to
meet that standard.
The NSS is intended to represent the highest level
national strategy document in the United States. It
establishes the strategic vision or grand strategic direction for the administration in power, provides the
“objectives,” and includes all the elements of national
power. It also serves as the “umbrella” strategy for
guiding a number of other national security related
strategy documents, like the Department of Defense’s
National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy, the QDR, and the national security-related strategies developed by other departments and agencies in
the U.S. Government.246
The U.S. NSS is designed to have a number of different purposes. The primary one is to convey it to the
various departments and agencies of the executive
branch, to “provide guidance on foreign and defense
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policies.”247 A second is to provide the President’s national security-related strategic guidance or vision to
Congress to substantiate the need for fiscal resources.
The third is to communicate the same vision to a number of other audiences, both foreign and domestic so
that they understand the administration’s intentions
in the national security arena. The fourth is to address
specific domestic audiences, frequently political supporters of the administration, that want to see their
national security concerns prominently highlighted. 248
Finally, the NSS assists in the establishment of a President’s national security agenda in the public domain.
As a strategic communications tool, the publication
of the NSS allows the administration an opportunity
to “publicly explain and sell its policies.”249 Much of
the information contained in the NSS was extracted
from the administration’s policy—often articulated in
key presidential speeches—essentially codifying what
was already stated.250
The NSS is to be considered a “public strategy document; one that can create a list of national interests
and “desirable goals,” but will not contain the detailed
ways and means needed for an executable strategy.
To a great degree, this is because it must be an unclassified document to serve as the strategic communications tool described above. The ways and means
specificity is traditionally contained in the classified,
and occasionally unclassified, directives (titled National Security Policy Directives [NSPD] in the Bush
43 administration and Presidential Policy Directives
[PPD] by the Obama administration) issued by an
administration on key national security issues requiring policy and strategy direction. 251 Examples would
be NSPD-9 (Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United
States) and PPD-6 (U.S. Global Development Policy).252
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The NSS is the only complete whole-of-government national security document that the U.S. Government publishes. All other national security related
strategies, like the NDS or the National Strategy for
Homeland Security (NSHS), are broad in scope, and
do cut across various levels and sectors of government, but are still narrower than the NSS in terms of
their focus on the needs of the national security problem that the specific strategy is charged with providing guidance for. Coordination for the NDS primarily
rests with the defense community, while coordination
for the NSHS is with the domestic security-focused
federal, state, and local governments. The NSS provides guidance that addresses all these areas and,
as such, is best developed through coordination and
collaboration with all government departments and
agencies that have responsibility for both foreign and
domestic national security concerns.253 This analysis
will review the development of three different NSSs
(2002, 2006, and 2010), selected because they required
the consideration of the many complex issues of the
post-9/11 world and because they were developed at
the direction of two different Presidents representing
two different political parties, and with the detailed
support of three different national security advisors
and associated NSC staffs.
2002 National Security Strategy.
Based upon the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, creation of the 2002 NSS was understood and accepted
as a statutory requirement by the administration of
George W. Bush (Bush 43). In particular, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed hard
for the NSS to be developed early in the first Bush 43
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administration so as to serve as guidance for the yet
to be developed NDS and National Military Strategy
(NMS). It was decided early that the 2002 NSS would
be a top down-directed document from the White
House, similar to the way that the Cold War containment strategy (NSC-68) was drafted in early 1950; by
only a small handful of people at the direction of the
government’s most senior leadership. This would ensure that the strategy would be framed with a strategic perspective.254 This approach to the crafting also
meant that very few would be involved, both in the
writing and in the associated interagency coordination. Presidential National Security Advisor (NSA)
Condoleeza Rice in direct consultation with Bush 43
made a determination to keep it very close hold. In
fact, in the copies that were distributed for coordination, a note was on the front indicating that it was for
the cabinet member’s eyes only.255
The NSC staff, under the direction of NSA Rice, solicited views from a variety of sources on what should
be included in the document. Of its own volition, the
State Department’s Office of Policy Planning headed
by Richard Haass crafted a comprehensive global
strategy in the summer of 2001 that read, in the eyes
of some readers, more like a report card than a national strategy, and was not written in the President’s
personal voice. The NSS was an official document and
required presidential signature prior to forwarding
to Congress. As a result, in the fall/winter of 2001-02,
NSA Rice requested Dr. Philip Zelikow, a highly respected academic from the faculty of the University
of Virginia, to develop the real first draft of the 2002
NSS.256
The issues to be addressed in the draft were discussed during a lunch meeting sometime during that
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same period between Dr. Zelikow, NSA Rice, Michael
Gerson, the President’s Chief Speechwriter, and Counselor to the President at that time, Karen Hughes. Dr.
Zelikow was also guided in his writing by several
speeches made by President Bush. Over the course of
the period that he worked on his draft, winter 2001-02
thru summer 2002, Zelikow met periodically for additional guidance with NSA Rice and the NSC Staff
Executive Secretary (NSC EXSEC), Stephen Biegun, as
well as with others like Robert Zoellick, the U.S. Trade
Representative, and Elliott Abrams, Special Assistant
to the President and Senior Director on the National
Security Council for Near East and North African Affairs, for additional comments on various issues. Zelikow crafted several drafts of the NSS. After she had
reviewed the initial draft NSS, NSA Rice had NSC EXSEC Biegun and Ms. Anna Perez rephrase some parts
of the document into a more colloquial form. In the
end, Zelikow had a significant foundational role in the
development of the initial draft of the 2002 NSS.257
After Zelikow received and inserted inputs from
the senior directors on the NSC staff, NSA Rice provided the final Zelikow draft to President Bush in
the summer of 2002. The President took it with him
to read in detail during a weekend that he spent at
the presidential retreat at Camp David, MD. After his
return from the Camp David weekend, he informed
NSA Rice that the document needed to be rewritten
in his own speaking voice. “I thought this document
was supposed to be my strategy . . . . It doesn’t sound
like me.” NSA Rice then took the Zelikow draft and
personally reworked it during July-September 2002.
She reworded and shortened it. NSA Rice also consulted with every senior director on the NSC staff
during this period on the issues that directly related
to them.258 It was during this time that NSA Rice final75

ized what became very politically sensitive comments
on the need for the United States to have the option to
actively preempt terrorists who had gained an ability
to strike American interests or the American homeland with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The
material on the preemption of terrorists had originally
been developed by Zelikow in one of his early drafts.
NSA Rice deleted some of that material and moved it
to the document’s WMD section. NSA Rice requested
NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger to review that section in detail and modified it based upon Bellinger’s
advice.259 When complete, the document was a significant revision and modification of the Zelikow draft
that represented the personal views of NSA Rice and
the President.260
The primary audiences for the 2002 NSS were the
U.S. Government national security interagency community (e.g., State, Defense, and the intelligence community), as well as the American people, the media,
and both external allies and enemies. There was a belief among senior participants in the drafting process
that Congress, as the nation’s legislative body, had a
larger role to play as part of the audience, and was not
engaged to the degree that it should have been by the
NSC staff. Using the Scowcroft Model on how the NSC
staff should operate, the NSC staff serves the President, not Congress. The departments in the Executive
Branch were the components of the federal government meant to work with Congress. As a result, there
was virtually no outreach to Congress in advance of
the document’s release at the end of September 2002.
Some in Congress felt strongly that they and the institution they represented had been slighted.261 To that
end, Senator Robert Byrd, a Democrat from West Virginia, stated that:
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the only reference to the Constitution . . . that is made
in this document titled ‘The National Security Strategy’
. . . (is) that: ‘The constitution has served us well . . . .
That is the alpha and the omega of the reference to the
Constitution. . . . And note, too, that the word ‘constitution’ as mentioned in the President’s document is in
lower case. . . . This administration doesn’t believe that
it merits a capital C even.”262

From the hindsight perspective of some of the 2002
NSS drafters, not engaging with Congress with its important role was an oversight.263
The 2002 NSS chapters were structured in order
of importance. This ranged from championing aspirations of human dignity and strengthening alliances
to defeating global terrorism and preventing attacks
against the United States and its friends at the highest end, down to transformation of America’s national
security institutions at the lower end.264 Clearly, the
leading placement of human dignity aspirations demonstrated an emphasis on the importance of valuedriven national interests for the strategy. During the
development of the document, it became clear that
in the post-9/11 era the spread of democracy had become embedded as a national interest in the battle of
ideals to defeat terrorism.265 NSA Rice believed it to be
key that the 2002 NSS, the first NSS of the post-9/11
world, should delineate the advancement of democracy and democratic institutions as vital U.S. national
interests. This thinking originated with the influence
of academic specialists on the Middle East like Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami, the 2002 Arab Human
Development Report, and “multiple conversations”
with President Bush. It would be these national interests from which the long-term objectives (end state
aims) for the 2002 NSS would be derived. 266
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The development of the national interests was not
a separate distinct process for the 2002 NSS. Zelikow
took the lessons of 9/11 about what to do in the world.
He understood that national interests would endure
after what had become the post-9/11 world. As noted
above, Zelikow also used a number of presidential
speeches to guide his national interest formulation.
In addition to the June 2002 West Point, NY, address,
he also examined the speeches at the Reagan Library
and the Citadel.267 He added the significance of terror
to the national interests in the discussion but did not
eliminate any other interests that had been delineated
in past strategic documents.268
Domestic political considerations were “minimal”
and not a major factor for the 2002 NSS drafters. This
was to be an articulation of the Bush 43 administration
policy regarding the formulation of national security
strategy that domestic politics did not have a role in
this development. The internal U.S. national debate
over whether to attack Iraq was taking place during
the final stages of the document’s drafting and coordination process in late summer 2002. NSA Rice wanted
the NSS to stand alone to represent the nation’s security strategy to the world writ large and not just for
Iraq. She did not want the Iraq debate to be addressed
in the document and, as such, “the case for Iraq was
not made by the strategy.”269
“Events and creative thinking” really determined
both the challenges (to include threats) and opportunities (ends) for the strategy. From President Bush’s
perspective, “inside every challenge is an opportunity
for the country.”270 Measures of effectiveness were not
created for the ends at the time of the drafting process. But in some aspects, they did come later for the
democratization and development objectives with the
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implementation of the Millennium Challenge Account
(MCA) program. The MCA began implementation in
2004, and subsequently the State Department utilized
those effectiveness measures developed for the MCA
program to assess progress towards the democratization and development objectives described in the 2002
NSS. 271
There were no operational objectives contained in
the NSS.272 The 2002 NSS was drafted with the intent
that the departments and agencies in the federal government that it was providing strategic guidance for
would create implementation plans that delineated
the strategy’s ways and means in detail. One such
example was the State Department’s Broader Middle
East and North Africa Initiative created in 2004 to advance democracy and economic development in the
region.273
The 2002 NSS was written to be resource unconstrained. The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) was never brought into the formulation process. A key unspoken assumption was that, in part,
the finished document was to be provided to the relevant government departments and agencies for them
to utilize as strategic justification for their budgets.274
The concept of risk as a separate entity was only
addressed in specific components of the 2002 NSS.
The world as an entity, and the associated international system, with its inherent risks was understood by
the crafters. For this type of a strategy, some believed
that risk cannot be assessed devoid of a separate specific case; it had to have detailed context.275 A place
that risk was directly evaluated concerned the issue
of the preemption of terrorists with a WMD capacity.
Risk associated questions that were assessed included: would the United States appear too aggressive to
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the world community if it delineated a preemptive
approach in the document, and should all potential
diplomatic options be exhausted before preemptive
measures requiring the military element of power be
used? Reflecting this risk analysis, the statement “We
will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions”276 was inserted into the text
of the document in the section that described the preemptive policy against WMD-equipped terrorists. The
section addressing preemption of WMD-equipped
terrorists was intentionally written in a very deliberate manner, with caveats as deemed appropriate; the
intent was to clarify the strategy’s intent in detail.277
Neither strategy spoilers nor modifiers were considered during the drafting, in part because the NSS
was designed as a strategy that would unfold over
a long-term period. The result was that the drafters
wanted to give the strategy the time that it needed to
work to minimize the potential of premature adjustment of the strategy.278 It was also a conscious decision
to not identify potential spoilers and modifying ways
and means to the strategy because of the possibility
such an effort would distract executing departments
and agencies from the primary direction of the NSS.279
Once NSA Rice’s final draft was complete, the President read it in detail, only providing minor changes.
After the President provided his comments on NSA
Rice’s draft, Deputy NSA Steve Hadley forwarded the
document to the senior leadership at State, Defense,
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); requiring
a very truncated review and transmission back to the
NSC staff. The departments were intentionally not informed that the President had already approved the
draft, so that they could feel completely unconstrained
to provide feedback comments. State provided a num-
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ber of comments, with some being accepted and others
not. CIA also returned a number of comments related
to their view of the world, but they were narrower in
scope than the State comments. The Department of
Defense (DoD) comments were primarily critical of
the fact that the NSS was being drafted at all, rather
than any of the substantive concepts. EXSEC Biegun
met with Defense Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) Doug Feith to address defense concerns
about the draft NSS. In a congenial meeting, with the
focus on the substance of the document, USDP Feith
was comfortable with the majority of the NSS and
only provided some relatively small substantive suggestions that were accepted. There was no significant
disagreement from any of the government institutions
on either the policy proposals or the premise that the
draft was a useful U.S. strategy.280
Once final and signed by the President, there was
no formal feedback mechanism in place to evaluate the
progress of the strategy once execution had begun.281
2006 National Security Strategy.
After President Bush had been reelected for his
second term in November 2004, NSA Rice was named
the new Secretary of State, and Deputy NSA Stephen
Hadley (NSA Hadley) was appointed the new NSA
to the President. After the November 2004 election,
NSA Hadley, in consultation with Bush 43, made a
determination in early 2005 that it was time for a new
NSS. It made sense to craft one every 4 years. While
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation mandates that
a national security strategy be transmitted to Congress on an annual basis, Congress never articulated
concern that the most recent Bush 43 NSS had been
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published in 2002. The nations’ national security situation had changed since September 2002. Some of
the 2002 objectives had been attained, like the fall of
Saddam Hussein and movement on the President’s
Freedom Agenda (support to enable democracies and
work with democracies as natural allies) via the color
revolutions in Lebanon, Ukraine, and Georgia, while
others had not, such as fulfillment of all goals towards
Iraq. It would be important to improve on the specific
articulation of parts of the 2002 NSS that had been
perceived as misunderstood, such as the preemption
policy targeting terrorists with a WMD capability, as
well as to address some of the adverse changes that
had taken place since it was published.282 One most
significant example was that the President felt it was
very important “to take the edge off of the preemption
statements (from the 2002 NSS) for the 2006 NSS without changing the substance of the policy.”283
Like the 2002 document, the 2006 NSS was designed
to be a top down-driven strategy, with detailed direction for the strategy’s structure and content to come
from the NSA and President. The President was the
principal stakeholder for the strategy, and everyone
else (both government and nongovernment actors)
was the audience. NSA Hadley wanted the NSS to
be an update rather than a fundamental new strategy
and indicated that the 2006 document should serve
as a continuity document from the 2002 NSS, to include the same chapter headings, plus one additional
one that addressed globalization. It would represent
a similar worldview for the President, with similar
threats and similar opportunities, and would also contain the lessons gained from the first Bush 43 administration in the national security realm. There would be
a recapitulation of the 2002 NSS and a summary of the
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Bush 43 administration’s first 4 years in the national
security arena. The new document would also include
greater detail on how to implement specific policies
and conclude with the nation’s strategic direction for
the future, especially for the war on terror.284
One of the first initiatives that NSA Hadley took
was to create a new office on the NSC staff, the Office of Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform.
Responsible for regional and functional strategic reviews, contingency planning, and other strategic planning duties, this would be the office that would draft
the 2006 NSS. Drs. Peter Feaver and William Inboden
were recruited from highly respected academic, State
Department, and think tank backgrounds to staff this
office and draft the new NSS. Dr. Feaver had also
served in the first Clinton administration NSC staff
where he served as the director-level coordinator for
the 1994 NSS. 285
In terms of the mechanics of the document’s crafting, NSA Hadley gave very specific guidance that the
NSS drafts were not to be shared with anyone else
beyond himself, and all writing was to be conducted
on a shared computer hard drive. There would be no
general distribution for interagency coordination. This
was done to ensure complete freedom for a deliberative drafting process without risk of leaks. There were
three primary reasons for such a top down, close hold
approach to guide the process: 1) to ensure adequate
operational security to prevent premature leaks; 2) to
achieve desired strategic coherence so that the parts
would all fit together, not appearing to be forced together by committee; and 3) to achieve the desire to
speak in one presidential voice. As the President’s
message to the world, it had to be in his speaking
voice. The President actually crossed out and added
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individual words. The document was to be short like
the 2002 NSS, both to help ensure that it would be “an
exercise in intellectual discipline” and so that people
would read it. The two drafters split the 10 chapters
between themselves for the actual writing, based
upon substantive expertise and personal preference.
It was a very collaborative process, and they would
repeatedly edit each other’s drafts prior to transmittal
to NSA Hadley.286
At the beginning of the drafting process in the
summer of 2005, Dr. Feaver solicited advice on the
substance of the new NSS from a number of respected
strategists in and out of government (e.g., Dr. Steven
Krasner, Director, Policy Planning, State Department;
Dr. John Lewis Gaddis, Professor at Yale University,
and Dr. Eliot Cohen, Professor at the Johns Hopkins
School for Advanced International Studies, among
many others). In early fall 2005, the drafters briefed a
limited Principals Committee meeting (with only the
key NSC national security oriented cabinet secretaries
and the CIA director present) to gain their approval
for the organization of the 2006 NSS and for strategic
guidance on particularly salient sections. Both drafters also met with the NSC Staff senior directors on an
individual basis to obtain their input for the sections
of the NSS that concerned them. NSA Hadley and
Deputy NSA J. D. Crouch, along with Mike Gerson,
the President’s chief speechwriter, would edit the
drafts on a line by line basis.287
The actual writing took place during OctoberDecember 2005. One of Dr. Feaver’s objectives was
to refine some of the language contained in the 2002
NSS that had been critiqued in public fora; in some
cases because he felt that it was misunderstood. One
example was the use of support for democratization
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as a tool against terrorism. Dr. Feaver also developed
a group of what he termed “trusted agents for each
cabinet secretary” that were resident in counterpart
components of the government’s national security
related interagency. These were Steve Krasner, Director of Policy Planning, and Philip Zelikow, Counselor
to the Secretary, both from the State Department;
Eric Edelman, the USDP from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Thomas Fingar from the National
Intelligence Council; John Hannah, the NSA to the
Vice President; Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of
the Treasury; and Lieutenant General Gene Renuart,
Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5), the Joint
Staff. He would dialogue separately with these individuals to gain their views on a variety of issues,
to include the format of the document. Examples of
valued input included development policy and issues
concerning Iraq from the State Department’s Krasner
and Zelikow. In addition, Dr. Feaver maintained a
close relationship with Barry Pavel, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, to ensure that
the 2006 NSS would be synchronized with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-produced NDS and
QDR, which were both undergoing development during this same period.288 Another key process innovation that the drafters employed was the use of a “Red
Team” to develop a critique of the 2002 NSS on a line
by line basis. They contacted Dr. Joseph Collins on the
faculty of the National War College, a former Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense, to put together a team
of highly qualified former practitioner academics that
would evaluate the document in detail and provide
their critique to the NSC staff drafters. Taking place
roughly between July and November 2005, the value
added was to ensure that the drafters had addressed
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all potential critiques of the substance contained in the
2002 NSS at the beginning of their drafting process.289
In early December 2005, NSA Hadley and both
drafters had an extended meeting with the President
to receive his comments on the first complete draft.
He felt the substance was good and liked the structure, but wanted the language to be more in his voice
so that “the average Joe in Lubbock, TX, could understand it.” More importantly, President Bush wanted
to make it clear that this was the American people’s
national strategy and he wanted them to be able to
take ownership for it. There would be no compromise
in the substance. His emphasis in the meeting with
the drafters was on democracy and human dignity as
“an antidote to the jihadists.” He also did not want
to minimize the importance of “American Exceptionalism” in the strategy. America still needs to be the
world leader and other countries want it to be. “Even
if countries gripe about it, they still want America to
lead.”290
For the development of the national interests, there
were two identified general priorities: the war on terror, to include the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and relations with the other major powers
(e.g., Russia, China, India, Japan, Europe, etc.). The
drafters were “not working with a blank sheet” but
rather were “standing in the shoes” of the prioritization established in the 2002 NSS. The analytical task for
the 2006 document lay in identifying where the 2002
strategy was working and where it was not, as well as
clarifying where the 2002 strategy was misunderstood
and where new realities necessitated new approaches.
The second Bush 43 inaugural address, given in January 2005, was also considered an important source
for how the President’s approach to America’s role in
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the world had evolved since 2002. The concepts of the
advancement of democracy and human dignity were
considered among the most important interests and,
in turn, among the most important chapters in the
strategy.291
The most important new development since the
2002 NSS was the unfolding of the war in Iraq. It commanded the lion’s share of strategic resources and attention, and its future trajectory would impinge on all
the other strategic aims of the NSS. At the same time,
Iraq was not the only strategic priority, and the United
States could not afford to suspend all other pursuits
until the fate of Iraq—whether the United States left
in victory or defeat—was settled. The challenge for
the drafters of the 2006 NSS was to capture both sides
of this coin: Iraq’s relative importance and the importance of the rest of the national security agenda. Timing was deemed to be key. If things were going well in
Iraq, the priority could shift downwards; the reverse
would be true if things were not going well: it would
push the priority higher. The lesson for the drafters of
the 2006 NSS was that, for the most part, the nation’s
national interests are enduring and do not change; the
exception is when there is one dominant event ongoing during the drafting, like a war; and for that, the
impact is on prioritization of the issue (the impact of
how resources are allocated) and its timing.292
Both the President and NSA Hadley made it clear
that domestic politics should not impact the substance
of the drafting of the NSS. In particular, President
Bush made it known that the NSS should not be limited to accommodate anti-Iraq policy isolationism,
economic trade protectionism, and anti-immigration
desires, but rather be drafted to rebut those influences
in the court of public opinion.293
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The drafters determined that the ways of countering the asymmetric approach of the jihadists was
the integrated employment of all the elements of national power. Kinetic action was needed to destroy
and degrade the terrorist network while the spread of
democratization, the advancement of human dignity,
and the expansion of prosperity through economic
development were needed to win the war of ideas. In
addition, another way to support those aims was the
maintenance of constructive relations with the other
powers, like China, Japan, India, and Pakistan, as well
as Europe.294
Actual resourcing, the means required for implementing the NSS, were not identified in the document.
It was to be an unconstrained strategy. The resource
intent was that the publication of the NSS “would
guide the strategic planning in the government’s departments and agencies for budget justification.” An
associated development for this NSS was the crafting
of what became known as the “Silver Bullet List.” This
document was developed by the NSC after the strategy’s publication with input from the same NSC staff
office that drafted the NSS; it identified about 10 specific national security related programs that mandated
NSA Hadley’s direct personal coordination with the
White House OMB. These 10 or so programs, many of
which were addressed either directly or indirectly in
the 2006 NSS (e.g., the desire for a civilian reserve corps
of development specialists in the State Department
Office of the Special Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization) became national security priorities
for resourcing. The Silver Bullet list did not consist of
the highest dollar items or even the top overall budget
priorities in the national security arena. Rather, the
list consisted of those priority items that the regular
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OMB budget development system might inadvertently downgrade were it not for top level NSC staff
intervention.295
While a specific risk assessment was never conducted, the intelligence community was tasked to
determine what could go wrong with specific policies
and strategies addressed in the NSS. Some policy and
strategy spoilers and modifiers were identified (“tried
to anticipate things that could go wrong”) such as what
would happen if a major country collapsed through
internal strife or what would be the connection between democratization and counter terror issues. It
was clear that, in addition to elections, democratization was also about the peaceful resolution of disputes
and religious tolerance. The drafters also addressed
the issue of preemption of terrorists with WMD; there
could be the risk of negative consequences if not carried out in consultation with allies. One very important comment about the concept of risk that emerged
from this discussion was “there are never enough resources to eliminate risk, only to reduce it.”296 T h e r e
were actually about 65 drafts of the 2006 NSS before
approval of the final one. NSA Hadley and Deputy
NSA Crouch spent a great deal of time reviewing the
key drafts, which numbered somewhere less than 10.
Secrecy remained fundamental. Once he felt that the
President was comfortable with the document’s direction, NSA Hadley authorized the two drafters to
share the contents with the NSC Staff senior directors
for their specific areas of focus. It was still maintained
in an extremely close hold format. There was no electronic transmission and the senior directors would
have to come to the White House Situation Room to
read their relevant sections and provide comments; no
one else on their staffs was permitted to view the draft.
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NSA Hadley also convened senior NSC staff meetings
devoted to critiquing draft sections of the NSS. The
President then reviewed the near final draft one last
time before providing it to the rest of the interagency
for final coordination. Bush 43 had to make some final
decisions at this point on language impacting delicate
issues like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which he
did. A paper copy of the NSS draft was sent by courier
to each of the NSC principals (Department Secretaries
and Agency Heads) 2-3 weeks before the document’s
release in March 2006. Only that senior individual and
one other designated person in the same organization would be allowed to review the draft. They had
to provide their comments in paper form within 72
hours; again, no electronic transmission. Finally, 5-6
days before the formal release, the 2006 NSS draft was
transmitted electronically for the first time for final
review by every NSC department and agency. The respective senior leadership could share the draft with
whomever they chose to. They had up to 48 hours to
return their comments to the NSC staff. At this point,
very few changes were proposed; but some were still
significant: the State Department wanted a change on
China and tougher language for Iran. The document
was finally sent to the printer in time for the March
2006 release.297
For the actual roll out of the strategy to the media, the American people, and the world by the same
President who had published the nation’s last national
security strategy, a crucial question for determination
was: should the 2006 NSS be depicted as a new strategy? The answer was no, it was not a new strategy;
rather, it was a “refined” one.298
While there was no immediate feedback mechanism to determine levels of success and failure created
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specifically for the 2006 NSS, during his tenure, NSA
Hadley created a separate management tool, dubbed
“Record 2008,” intended to track progress toward specific goals and objectives in the national security arena
for the second Bush 43 administration. These desired
accomplishments were tied to the objectives for the
2006 NSS (e.g., what was the progress for democratization in Iraq?). There were also tasks associated with
each of the identified objectives. Record 2008 was conceived as a management tool to enable NSA Hadley
and his senior staff to monitor progress, or the lack
thereof, for policies in their areas of responsibility.
This analysis took the form of a “stoplight chart,” with
color coding for each policy. If the color was green,
then the execution of the policy was believed to be on
track to attain the established end state aims for it. If
the color was orange, it was deemed not on track but
not requiring a fundamental reconsideration of the
policy and strategy; with a bit more effort, attention,
or resources, the policy could get back on track. If the
color was red, it would mean that not only was the
policy not on track to achieve the desired objectives
but also that the policy would require a fundamental
revision to attain the aims that had been set. If a policy
area received a critical mass of red lights, it was ripe
for a thorough interagency review to examine the entire policy and determine changes that would have to
be made, as happened with Iraq policy towards the
end of 2006. The analysis for the chart was supposed
to be conducted on a quarterly basis by the responsible
NSC staff directors and provided to NSA Hadley.299
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2010 National Security Strategy.
This NSS drew on the Obama administration National Security Priorities Review (NSPR). The NSPR
was initiated to create a broad assessment of national
security issues that the new administration would
face, to focus the senior Obama administration national security leadership team around one coherent set
of national security priorities early in the President’s
new term, and to provide a broad framework at the
global strategic level for the administration’s national
security approach. The NSPR came about, in part, because of concern in January 2009 that the Defense-led
QDR, along with strategic reviews being developed
by other departments, could be conducted in an autonomous manner from the remainder of the other
traditional national security documents that are typically drafted (remembering that Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates would remain in his position after the
Bush 43 administration departed office, and already
had his staff working on the QDR), and with no direction yet from the new Obama White House. This new
review would be a classified document orchestrated
by the Defense Strategy Directorate from the National
Security Staff—the new title for what had previously
been known as the NSC Staff. Planners from all the
departments and agencies with a national-security
role were identified to provide the views of their organizations for the review. The NSPR addressed major threats, challenges, and opportunities and tiered
them in priority order from the perspective of the
President—it was to ultimately represent his national
security priorities. The document was designed to describe the environment and framework that would be
used to advance the national security agenda for the
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new Obama administration leadership team, which
approved the final document at a Principals Committee meeting in the March-April 2009 timeframe.300
Having the information from the NSPR, and understanding the congressional requirement for the
administration to produce an NSS, General (Retired)
James Jones, the first NSA for President Obama, directed the National Security Staff Office of Strategic
Planning to work with the President’s chief speechwriter and Deputy NSA Ben Rhodes to develop the administration’s NSS. Rhodes was critical in the Obama
administration process because of the personal relationship that he had with the President and the ability
that he would have to capture his thinking on national
security issues, as well as the President’s voice in the
actual writing style. He also had an excellent appreciation of the domestic political aspects that could influence the NSS. In the end, he was the only drafter
who consistently worked directly with the President
on the document.301
The intent of the NSS would be to articulate the
President’s key concepts in the national security arena. The document was designed to describe broad
concepts. It would provide a general construct and associated ways for a vision of how the Obama administration would approach international and domestic
security.302
The initial drafters in the Strategic Planning office
(Colonel Ron Tuggle, Mr. Tom Greenwood, and Ms.
Kate Phillips Charlet), under the supervision of Ambassador Mary Yates, Special Assistant to the President and Special Advisor of Strategic Planning, spoke
with the drafters of the 2006 NSS, Drs. Peter Feaver
and William Inboden, both of whom were very helpful in their description of the process and the pitfalls
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that they encountered during the course of the drafting effort. The Obama administration drafters initially reviewed the 2002 and 2006 NSSs in detail to
determine where the differences should be for their
document.303 They used the NSPR, as well as a number of President Obama’s speeches, like the one made
in Cairo, Egypt, and the Oslo Peace Prize acceptance
speech, along with national strategy documents that
had come before, such as previous NSSs and QDRs,
to provide the President’s thinking and voice for the
writing.304 President Obama formally met with his
NSA, NSS Deputies, and Ambassador Yates twice to
review progress and drafts and to provide direct guidance for the drafters, ensuring that they were “on the
right path.” The President directed the drafters to emphasize prosperity, both at home and abroad, and the
concept that while the United States will continue to
play a major leadership role, it would be important to
identify ways to have other countries also play leadership roles within the international system. President
Obama felt strongly that domestic homeland security
and external national security policy and strategy must
all be viewed as part of the nation’s national security
effort; with the result that homeland security would
be included as an equal part of the Obama NSS.305 The
drafters worked on the document for 6-8 months (from
the later part of 2009 to May 2010) and coordinated
very closely with the other National Security Staff directorates to frame their respective issues (e.g., cyber
security, counterterrorism, intelligence, defense, and
global development).306
After the initial draft of the 2010 NSS was complete, it was transmitted for comment to the counterpart offices in the other national security related
departments and agencies by the Strategic Planning
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Office (e.g., State, OSD, Joint Staff, DHS, Office of
the Director for National Intelligence, Treasury, and
Justice). They were given a few days to respond with
comments in preparation for a Deputies Committee
meeting review of the NSS draft. The same thing occurred in advance of a Principals Committee meeting.
Roughly 70 percent of the feedback was incorporated
in the document. NSA Jones felt it very important to
receive and consider the input from the other departments and agencies.307
Ambassador Yates consulted frequently throughout the document development process with counterparts in other government agencies: State, OSD, and
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In part,
these consultations took place to ensure that national
security-related strategy documents being developed
by these departments during this same time period,
like the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR),
were informed and synchronized by the soon to be
published NSS. In addition to the solicitation of formal input from various government actors, NSA
Jones also solicited the comments of outside senior
readers including two that had retired from government service: Colin Powell, former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Secretary of State, and
Thomas Pickering, former Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs. One of the drafts was transmitted to
them, and they both provided valuable input to the
drafting process.308
For this NSS, a stakeholder was described as an actor who had something to either gain or lose in relation to the document. In this case, the President was
the key stakeholder. The audiences consisted of the
domestic constituents (not all of them—only the more
influential ones like Congress and labor unions) and
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certain influential countries in the external political
realm.309
Lower level national security documents that addressed national interests were reviewed during the
development of the national interests for the 2010
NSS. Previous NSSs were also reviewed but did not
influence the drafter’s recommendations concerning
which national interests to select and what priority
order to place them in. Four enduring interests were
decided upon, with the economy given a high priority
role based on Obama administration belief that “more
influence comes from economic leadership than from
military might.” Security of the homeland would always be the highest priority.310
Domestic political considerations did play a role
in the development of this document. There was a
conscious decision made by NSA Jones to address
“homeland security related concerns,” which meant
that in addition to the global economy, issues like
the domestic economy, human capital, education and
support for U.S. businesses would be addressed and
supported as part of the core foundation for American
national security.311 The end state aims were derived
from the national interests. There were supporting objectives aligned with each interest. But, in effect, these
were objectives that were really designed to be aspirations as opposed to objectives that could be fully attained. This approach permitted real flexibility for the
NSS. There were no real measures of effectiveness for
the strategy because of the determination to write it as
a less specified document.312
The ways to aspire towards the national interest
derived end states were delineated in Chapter III (Advancing Our Interests) of the document, with a number of them identified under the headings of Security,
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Prosperity, Values, and International Order.313 Despite
the NSS being a document of the highest policy and
strategy, the administration did consult with OMB to
explore methods of applying fiscal constraints to the
NSS; this was found to prove difficult when dealing at
the strategic broad concept level. Risks were assessed
and discussed as interests were prioritized.314
The Office of the Director for National Intelligence
was tasked to provide analysis of events that could
take place that would serve to spoil components of
the strategy. They helped to identify potential spoilers
(e.g., what would happen if elements in South America
responded negatively to the NSS?).315 The document
was also reviewed two to three times by the intelligence community to determine what might have unintended consequences with U.S. allies and others. It
was very important to the Obama administration that
the NSS was a clear articulation of the policies and
priorities but not inadvertently offend other countries,
and the intelligence community had the responsibility
to craft that analysis for the drafters.316
Once NSA Jones approved the final draft of the
NSS, it was then approved at a Deputies Committee
meeting, a limited (only national security related departments and agencies represented) Principals Committee meeting, and then approved and signed by the
President. President Obama was very involved in the
content of the NSS and personally drafted the 3-page
introductory cover letter.317
A COMPARISON
The governments in each of the five case studies set
out to accomplish a similar purpose—to develop national security strategy-type documents that will pro-
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vide strategic direction for the nation in the national
security arena for an established period of time. Their
approaches differ to varying degrees. What is clear at
the beginning is that there are pluses and minuses to
each approach, in part, because each strategy is developed in somewhat different conditions and, at times,
for a number of purposes. This section will provide a
comparison and contrast the approaches.
Oversight.
Until the last several years, it was only the United
States that had developed whole-of-government national security strategy-type documents on a regular
basis. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates that
requirement for the crafting of a national security strategy report for Congress on an annual basis and within
the first 150 days of a new presidential administration
taking office.318 In a formalized manner, the creation
of such documents on a multiagency-level goes all the
way back to the National Security Act of 1947 legislation.319 The NSS would establish the strategic vision
or grand strategic direction for the administration in
power. It is intended to be a stand-alone document
that will help guide the national security-related documents of other U.S. Government departments and
agencies. There have been 15 U.S. NSSs published to
date since the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
In addition to the U.S. legislation mandating the
crafting of national strategy on a regular basis, Brazil
codified a requirement in August 2010 to update the
NSD every 4 years, as well as requiring the publication
of a new White Paper document designed to implement the NSD. Each new presidential regime would
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be required to publish an NSD in the second year of
its administration. Australia, South Africa, and the
UK are all directed to develop their national security
strategy-type documents based upon the discretion
of the government in power. There is no legislation
in place for these countries requiring the creation of a
national security strategy-like document. It will be a
political decision to craft one.
Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and the UK have all
published national security strategy-type documents
that involved government actors outside of the respective defense ministries. But it is only the UK that
has published a true whole-of-government NSS to
date. The Labor Party, followed by the Conservative/
Liberal Democrat Party Coalition, all supported the
necessity to develop both an NSS and, in the case of
the Coalition government, an SDSR that was directly
related to the NSS (published in 2010); both following
the 2008 and 2009 WPs. The NSS provided the ends
and the SDSR provided the detailed ways and means
for the nation’s national security establishment. The
Australian Labor Party administration directed the
publication of the 2008 National Security Statement and
the 2009 WP. While neither of these documents meets
the definition of a true NSS, they are able to provide
the necessary direction to the nation’s armed forces.
South Africa did something similar with the South
African 1996 White Paper and 1998 Defence Review;
both directed by the first post-apartheid government
and requiring two related documents to depict the
ends in one and the ways and means in the other. One
major exception between the Australian and South
African documents was that the Australian strategies
were whole-of-government crafted, while the South
African ones were developed primarily by the MOD
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in conjunction with the separate armed services, as
well as civil society. Finally, Brazil published its first
whole-of-government document in 2008; similar to the
Australian, South African, and UK defense reviews,
but with a primary emphasis on organization and development of the armed forces.
In addressing the organization of the armed forces,
Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and the UK had developed working groups specifically created to work on
the actual crafting of the respective documents. For
the most part, these individuals had virtually no other
duties during their time on these groups other than
to work on the document. The drafting effort for each
country was a bit different.
For Australia, the 2009 WP crafting effort was led
and conducted by the DoD, while the NSS was crafted
by the members of the Office of the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet. In the case of Brazil, both the MOD and
the Strategic Affairs Ministry committed personnel to
working groups that prepared the 2008 NSD; with the
MOD having overall responsibility. The 1996 South
African White Paper was drafted by a MOD working
group with the Deputy MOD personally involved in
the process. The 1998 Defence Review was organized
differently, with participation from a larger number
of actors, both state and nonstate. In addition to the
MOD lead and other MOD personnel, sub working
groups were established that included personnel from
the SANDF services, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
intelligence community, police, members of Parliament, and some individual members from civil society (from academia and NGOs).
In the case of the UK, the 2008 NSS was developed
by a whole-of-government working group committee
that was led and managed by the Cabinet Office Na-
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tional Security Secretariat with representation from
the MOD, FCO, HO, DFID, and intelligence agencies.
The MOD and FCO actually crafted their own chapters. This committee also had to consolidate significant
input that was received in the way of a draft document written by some of the Prime Minister’s personal
advisors. The National Security Secretariat-led team
had to consolidate the two drafts. The same drafting
process was utilized for the 2009 and 2010 UK NSSs.
In 2010, the UK also produced its SDSR for the first
time in 11 years. Written concurrently with the NSS
and released 1 day apart, the SDSR drafting group expanded beyond that of the NSS to include the DECC,
Departments of Transport and Communities, and the
HMT, critical to ensure that the fiscal resource ways
for the document would be addressed.
The U.S. NSSs were developed in a somewhat different manner. This was the only case where there was
no identified specifically committed working group
that involved more than one department or agency.
The document was always written in utmost secrecy,
with only a handful of senior personnel involved. All
three NSSs were written by select personnel on the
NSC/NSS staff. Typically, no more than a handful
of individuals actually worked on each of the three
NSSs that were addressed. They were either assigned
to a special strategic planning directorate on the Staff
or, as in the case of the 2002 NSS, were individually
requested to work on the draft as an outside expert
and have the final draft written by the NSA herself. In
all three cases, the drafting of the NSS was always an
additional task to the other daily duties that all of the
involved personnel participated in. The only addition
was when the 2006 NSS drafting team reached out to a
“Red Team” of academics to review the previous 2002
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NSS to suggest where improvements could be made
for the new document.
There were three different approaches to document coordination and the determination of which
actors would be involved in the process. Australia,
Brazil, and the UK have a policy to maximize wholeof-government coordination from the very beginning
of the drafting process—including all related ministries/departments and agencies, and doing it often
in a formal process during the entire period of the
document’s development. The emphasis is clearly on
inclusion vice exclusion for any of the national-level
national security-oriented institutional actors. The
South African approach only involved the MOD and
the services, but was influenced to a certain degree by
the civil society. The U.S. process involved all respective departments and agencies that had NSC membership, but with the exception that those not on the
actual NSC/NSS staff were typically given much less
time to review and comment.
Strategic Context.
The stakeholders and audiences were essentially
the same in all five cases with some select exceptions
and with different degrees of importance placed on
certain audiences. All primary stakeholders were in
the executive branch, with the chief executive (president or prime minister and his office, along with the
department or ministry of defense, to include the
services of the armed forces). The one exception was
the United States—Defense and the services were not
considered stakeholders. Additional executive branch
national security related ministerial stakeholders included the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
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(DFAT) for Australia and the Brazilian Strategic Affairs ministry. In the case of South Africa, given its very
powerful role in the near aftermath of apartheid, the
Parliament had to approve both the White Paper and
the Defence Review, thus placing itself in the position
of a stakeholder. It could also be argued that with the
close inclusion of the ministries or offices responsible
for fiscal resources in the cases of Australia and the
UK, that these actors also became stakeholders in the
national strategy development process. In addition, to
varied degrees, the fidelity for the ways and means
provided in the 2008 Brazilian NSD necessitated the
inclusion of all government implementing actors of
the strategy as stakeholders early in the process. These
included the Ministries of Planning, Budget, and Management; Finance; Science and Technology; Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade; and, the Interior.
Finally, for the Australian and UK cases, the political
parties in power at the time of document development
could also be considered stakeholders because of their
role in directing the strategies to be crafted while they
were still out of power and vying for elected office.
The audiences for the documents and crafting
authorities were also essentially the same with the
exception of the civil society. These primary audiences consisted of the other relevant departments and
agencies in the executive branch of the government,
the legislative branch (parliament and congress), the
media, and other countries. Civil society was a unique
and intentional audience on the part of the Australian
and South African governments. In both cases, there
was a conscious decision to reach out to civil society
(academia, think tanks, business, industry and, in the
case of South Africa, even clergy and NGOs like Green
Peace, and leadership at the local community level.
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Both countries held parliamentary hearings and formal public meetings to ensure that these voices were
heard on their views about national security for the
respective nation. Brazil consulted with think tanks,
retired military officers, and former ministers of the
services. Also, U.S. drafting teams held informal consultations with certain think tank and academic personnel, as well as a number of well known former
government leaders.
There were no identified domestic or international
legal issues for any of the national strategy making
cases, with the exception that it was intended that
no known laws be circumvented or ignored. Also, in
each case, all prior related policies and strategies were
reviewed; especially when similar formal documents
had been produced in the past, such as the Australian
or UK white papers or SDSRs, or the U.S. NSS.
National Interests and Domestic Political
Considerations.
For Brazil, South Africa, and the United States,
national interests were typically identified from prior
national strategy documents, the nation’s constitution,
or presidential speeches, as in the case of the United
States, and were associated with themes of key importance to each country. The Brazilian interests were
derived from the National Defense Policy of 2005 and
were related to issues like sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regional stability. South African national
interests were directly linked to the 1996 Constitution
and focused on the nation’s new democratic system,
the achievement of social justice, economic development, as well as assuring neighboring countries that
South Africa had neither the intent nor the desire to
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intimidate them. U.S. interests were normally found
in prior speeches that the serving President had made,
or originated with key events like the aftermath of the
9/11 attack, the war on terror, and the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Australian approach to identifying national
interests also employed previous white papers as a
start point, especially the 2000 White Paper for the
interests in the 2009 document. At the same time,
because the government was willing to accept additional international or external obligations and the fact
that domestic security interests had grown because of
the events of 9/11 and the Bali bombings, there was
a more in-depth examination of what the 2009 interests should be. The crafters of the 2009 White Paper
determined that geography would be a key variable
for their national interest decisions; with the premise
that the closer a threat was to Australian territory, the
greater the importance of that interest.
For the UK, the national interests in the 2010 NSS
were, in part, a product of a debate between “hard”
and “soft” interests, so that issues like energy security
interests could be developed in the same context as interests related to terror or the conflict in Afghanistan.
In addition, the UK NSRA methodology was also employed to prioritize risks that could then be identified
as interests and would be prioritized in accordance
with the same risk assessment approach.
The only real domestic political considerations
were those involving the commitments made by the
political parties with administrations in power in Australia and the UK. These parties had made electoral
commitments to produce the White Paper in Australia
and the NSS and SDSR in the UK. Therefore, having
made campaign promises, it was incumbent on the
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newly elected administrations to develop the documents in a timely manner.
Facts, Assumptions, and Other Factors Framing
Strategy Development.
Each of the drafting teams/individuals received
guidance and direction from the senior elected officials in the administrations, either a president or
prime minister. In the case of South Africa, the teams
also received some guidance from parliament. The
guidance came in both the substance as well as, in the
case of the United States, in the desire that the document be drafted using the President’s personal voice
for a writing style.
The Brazilian NSD, the first two UK NSSs, and
the U.S. NSSs were intentionally drafted to be unconstrained by resources. The belief was that if the strategy was sound, the resources would follow. This was
not the case for Australia, South Africa, or the 2010 UK
documents. In the Australian case, the Departments
of Finance and Treasury were brought in at the beginning of the development for the 2009 White Paper to
ensure that fiscal considerations were addressed at every step of the formulation process. The South African
White Paper and Defence Review were based upon
an assessment of the likely budget, with the budget
driving the strategy rather than the strategy mandating the budget. For the 2010 UK NSS and SDSR, Her
Majesty’s Treasury was brought in at the beginning of
the drafting process to advise on fiscal resource issues;
the documents were also intended to be in line with
the government’s Comprehensive Spending Review
(CSR), which was released the same month that the
2010 NSS and SDSR were released.
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The threat challenges for the strategy documents
were evaluated by the respective Australian, South
African, UK, and U.S intelligence communities. All
identified threats were also assessed in the formal
or semi-formal risk assessment processes that all but
the United States utilized. For Brazil, rather than the
intelligence community, the Ministry for Strategic
Planning developed the threats, ranging from lack of
societal participation in matters of national defense
and budget insufficiency to the obsolescence of military equipment and restrictions of technology transfer
placed on Brazil by more advanced countries.
Identification of the Strategy’s Objectives
and Measures of Effectiveness.
In some manner, all five countries derived a strategy’s objectives from their national interests. As an
example, the Brazilian ends were contained in their
2005 national policy document and directly linked
to the 1988 Federal Constitution. But in effect, most
objectives were aspirations as opposed to objectives
that could be fully attained, thus permitting various
degrees of flexibility for portions of the strategies.
The only country that developed a formal approach
utilizing measures of effectiveness for a national strategy was Brazil. This was accomplished with the employment of a system developed in the United States
(Balanced Scorecard Performance Measurement System) and applied to the supporting objectives contained in the Brazilian NSD, in coordination with the
ways and means found in the NSD’s Implementation
Measures section.
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Ways (Courses of Action) and Means.
As written, only the Brazilian NSD contained detailed ways and means. The ways and means in the
four other state strategies were either developed at the
classified level and not published in the public documents (Australia and South Africa), or were developed in a fairly generic manner (UK and the United
States), with the intent that the relevant departments
and agencies responsible for executing the national
strategy would draft the detailed ways and means.
There was one exception for the United States: after
the publication of the 2006 NSS, the U.S. NSC Staff did
develop a management tool, the “Silver Bullet List,” to
highlight certain national security-related programs
that may have been associated with ways required to
implement portions of the strategy in order to coordinate their funding with the White House OMB. Most
significantly, for the Brazil NSD, the detailed ways
and means in the Implementation Measures section
were provided with such a degree of fidelity that the
implementing ministries could begin their planning
processes for execution without further guidance.
Risk Assessment.
Australia and the UK had formal risk assessment
processes in place for their national strategy development. Brazil, South Africa, and the United States did
address some risk on a much more ad hoc basis, to include potential strategy spoilers and modifiers. Brazil
did consider the risk of the impact of providing more
funding to defense at the expense of other parts of the
national economy. South Africa examined the impact
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of budget restrictions on the ability to attain national
interest objectives during the development of the 1998
Defence Review. The U.S. drafters for the 2006 NSS
tasked the intelligence community to determine what
could go wrong with some specific policies and strategies contained in the document, with a number of
important spoilers being identified (e.g., Hamas being
elected to office). One important analytical point in
terms of modifiers that emerged from the U.S. evaluation was that “there are never enough resources to
eliminate risk, only to reduce it.”
Both the Australian and UK risk assessment processes were formalized. Australia conducted a highly
classified assessment for the 2009 WP. Known as the
Strategic Risk Assessment, it addressed risk context,
assessment, treatment, and review over the course of
time. Based on the outcome of workshops that conducted the analysis of a number of issues, to include
potential scenarios, both domestic and international,
the document drafters developed modifiers, or “risk
treatment” approaches for the WP that were inserted
in the Australian strategy. The UK developed the
NSRA methodology for the 2010 NSS and SDSR. The
NSRA was implemented through a series of workshops, that also included a number of government
“subject matter experts,” analysts, and intelligence
personnel, to compare, assess, and prioritize all major
risks over the next 5 to 20 years that could potentially
disrupt components of the national strategy. The likelihood and impact were considered for each risk issue.
This process was considered so valuable to the drafting process that it was decided to formally update it
every 2 years.
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Approval Authority.
The strategies for all five countries required executive branch approval, either by the president or
prime minister. These final decisions by the senior
executives were made after consultation with executive branch ministers/secretaries at the conclusion of
review processes that had taken place. For Brazil, this
required a meeting of the National Defense Council,
and a Principal’s Committee meeting for the United
States. The Australian and UK leaderships approved
their documents after extensive whole-of-government
drafting efforts that had taken place over a number of
months. In the South African case, in addition to the
President and Minister of Defence, it was important
to obtain the approval of the parliament for the 1996
White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review.
Feedback Mechanism.
Brazil, South Africa, the UK, and for the most part
the United States, have no formal feedback mechanism
in existence that would tell the government when
components of the strategy were successful and when
they were not. As it has done with other policy and
strategy documents, the Australian Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet reviews the progress of
the 2009 White Paper quarterly, based upon submission of information from the DoD. These reviews are a
long time tradition in the Australian government and
are considered important in light of the need to demonstrate the ability to meet electoral commitments
made by a new government. In the case of the United
States, while there has not been a feedback mecha-
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nism specifically designed for an NSS, the NSC staff
administration of NSA Hadley developed a feedback
mechanism for policies approved by the NSPD-1 process of deputies and principals committee meetings.
“Record 2008” was employed to monitor the evolution of a number of key policies on a quarterly basis. It
was designed to assess the policies for success, if they
required a bit more effort, attention, or resources, or if
they would need a fundamental revision to attain the
aims that had been set.
IS THERE A BEST WAY?
The analysis of the five case studies demonstrates
that there is no one proven way for crafting national
security strategy documents. But there are valuable
lessons that can be derived from these cases and, when
combined, these could serve as a viable start point for
a future drafting effort. This section will attempt to
provide that start point for future national strategy
document development.
Requirement.
There are three primary reasons why the development of a national security strategy type document
can assist a country in its navigation of national security issues:
1. Resourcing—to better align national security
priorities and funding;
2. Coordination—to reduce duplication of effort
between government departments and agencies, as
well as between different tiers of the government; and
3. Communication—to provide better clarity for
both the government and private sector.320
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As described, these represent benefits to both
stakeholders and audiences to ensure the security of
the respective state. The complexities of the 21st century feature challenges and associated opportunities
that are in a continuous condition of change or modification. The result is the need to institutionalize the
requirement to develop a national security strategytype document on a regular basis, to be done in tandem with other key national strategy documents, like
the NDS and QDR for the United States, SDSR for the
UK, the Defence Review for South Africa, and the new
White Paper for Brazil. This formalization of the requirement will ensure that national security strategy
is being consistently reviewed for modification and
adjustment.
The U.S. 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates
a requirement for the crafting of a national security
strategy report for Congress on an annual basis and
within the first 150 days of a new presidential administration taking office.321 As written, both requirements
are infeasible. At the national level of government, it
is rare for a nation to have to change its national strategy on an annual basis; such a change would likely
only occur in time of the need for a response to a major event (e.g., 9/11, changes in an ongoing war). The
two Bush 43 administrations crafted one NSS during
every 4 years, and as of this writing, there has only
been one Obama administration NSS. Of the 15 U.S.
NSSs to date, six of them were written by new administrations (Bush 41, Clinton twice, Bush 43 twice, and
Obama) and none of these were published within the
established 150-day period; publication usually taking place during the second year of a new administration. The absence of additional NSSs and the fact that
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none were published during the first 150 days of an
administration have never been missed. An equally
important consideration for a new administration is
that it needs time to put in place all of its political appointee senior leaders in positions that have a national
security agenda; and provide them with a “learning
period,” the time necessary to understand the issues
they have been appointed to work, which is likely to
take months. Typically many of the appointees may
not even have been approved by Congress at the 150day mark.322
Recommendation. It is more appropriate to institutionalize something similar to the 2010 Brazilian legislation requiring production of an NSS-type document
(NSD for Brazil) every 4 years and the requirement
for a new presidential administration to produce one
in the second year of its administration. This must be
flexible to be able to accommodate the need for a new
strategy to be created in a situation where a major
event took place during the life of the administration.
The legislation should stipulate that the development
of the NSS should be coordinated with the production of other key national security strategy-type documents and stipulate them by name and how often they
are to be written.
Organization.
Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and the UK had
developed dedicated working groups to conduct the
actual writing of the documents. The participants normally had no other responsibilities during the time
that they served on the working groups, allowing them
total focus on the very complex task at hand. In part,
the issue is that the regular positions that the drafters
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typically occupy are so busy that those activities will
likely take away from the difficult work required for
the national strategy document. The composition of
three of four of the working groups encompassed all
ministries/departments involved in national security;
the South African one only involved the MOD and the
services.
With the exception of South Africa, all drafting efforts were either led by an organization similar to the
U.S. National Security Staff, or as in the case of Brazil,
by two ministries working together. For the document in question to be a true whole-of-government
product, it warrants leadership for its development from the center of executive branch power, as
opposed to a single (South Africa) or two (Brazil)
ministries. The United States also established an Office of Strategic Planning during the second Bush 43
administration on the NSC staff. This office had the
responsibility to craft the NSS, conduct regional and
functional strategic reviews, and perform contingency
planning.323 It was a unique office for the NSC staff because its emphasis was on longer term strategic planning responsibilities. An additional component of the
U.S. organization for the 2006 NSS was the creation of
the “Red Team” from the National Defense University. This group was able to provide in depth analysis
of the previous NSS (2002) and its applicability or lack
thereof to the conditions faced by the drafters in 20052006; an asset in determining where the NSS that was
being drafted should differ from the previous one.
Finally, Australia published a document that
specifically delineated their government’s strategic
planning process in detail, especially their model for
the development of a national strategy. It includes
addressing government direction, strategic guid-
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ance, strategic planning for operations, international
engagement, preparedness, capability, and budget
planning.324
Recommendation: Dedicated working groups
should be created and led by the national security
staff of the nations’ senior executive (e.g., Office of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet for Australia; National
Security Secretariat for the UK; and the NSC for the
United States).
The actual national security staff participation
should come from a permanent directorate/office on
these staffs that are designed to focus on long-term
strategic planning. Responsibility for the actual drafting of the national strategy document should be given
to this strategic planning office to ensure it has a coherent top-down focus directly from the chief executive. This allows for direct access to the office of the
chief executive for guidance and direction. It would
provide the detailed direction for the wider working
group and collate the writing effort. The national security staff office will have to be staffed with a sufficient number of personnel to allow members the opportunity to solely work on projects and have no other
responsibilities for extended periods of time. Associated working groups would assess and coordinate review of the strategy document. Ideally the members
of the wider working group should also have no other
responsibilities during the time of the drafting effort
and have direct access to the senior leadership of all
departments and agencies in the government that have
a stake in the document. As in the Australian and UK
cases, consideration should be given to having representation from the departments and agencies with a
major stake in the document on the full time drafting
team (e.g., DoD/MOD, MFA/State Dept, Joint Staff/
General Staff).
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Recommend the creation of a “red team” to review
the previous document and challenge its assertions
for continued applicability and inclusion in the new
one being drafted.
Also recommend publication of a document that
delineates the strategic planning process for the government in sufficient detail that any mid-senior level participant in the whole-of-government process
would understand the national strategy formulation
process approach to be taken.
Coordination.
The whole-of-government coordination that was
conducted in Australia, Brazil, and the UK appeared
to facilitate the inclusion of the departments/ministries and agencies representing all the elements of
national power in the respective governments. The
United States orchestrates this process in a very close
hold manner with direction coming from the top (directly from the chief executive) down to the few on
the NSS staff drafting the document. There is potential
disadvantage that mid levels of the interagency that
are knowledgeable in implementation requirements
will not be able to provide input. There is also risk
that stakeholders in other departments/ministries
and agencies that had minimal opportunity to coordinate will not be comfortable enough with the strategy to ensure buy-in from their organization after the
drafting process is complete.325 At the same time, there
is also risk that the inclusion of so many actors will
lead to a document of compromise that addresses every conceivable issue, with none of them being given
priority. The result would be a document reflecting
bureaucratic consensus with no real focus.
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This emphasis on inclusion rather than exclusion
of actors that would have responsibility for executing
the national strategy would likely lead to greater acceptance of the strategy’s objectives even before the
required planning for implementation took place. It
would also have the added advantage of ensuring that
concerns from the related departments/ministries
with strategy proposals could be evaluated prior to
the document being forwarded for senior leader review. Finally, when distributed for highest-level approval, adequate time should be provided for the departments/ministries and agencies to ensure proper
internal review.
Recommendation: A regularized coordination process be established for the national strategy formulation process that ensures all departments/ministries
and agencies that have a stake in the document are
permitted time to properly address document issues
of relevance to those actors, to include the entire document when necessary. They should be given adequate
time for review and comment as required. But in the
end, the senior executive leadership must make the
final decisions for the strategy document. To be a true
successful national strategy, it must be one that ensures prioritization of national objectives and focuses
on the key issues vice every issue facing the nation
during that period in time. This means that, for focus,
the process must be driven from the top and the document cannot be founded on consensus because it is the
chief executive’s vision that is at stake.
Stakeholders.
As noted earlier, the stakeholders are key because
the document is written to attain objectives that they
are accountable for to their public and their political
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party. In addition to the chief executive of the state
and to a somewhat lesser degree, the departments/
ministries and agencies that have national security
responsibility and are charged with implementing
the national strategy must also be considered to be
stakeholders. This inclusion becomes important for
the complete acceptance and support for the document from within the whole-of-government devoted
to national security issues; especially because these
other stakeholders will have to work to attain fiscal
resources for their execution responsibilities.
Recommendation: Government departments/ministries and agencies with national security authorities
should be formally identified as stakeholders in the
national security strategy formulation process. It must
be understood that for purposes of a national security
strategy type document, the chief executive is the primary stakeholder and the NSS needs to reflect his/her
views and style of expression.
Audience.
The importance of the domestic audience is significant for obtaining support for the resources necessary to implement the national strategy. Key audiences would be the Congress or Parliament, as well as
the media, and other countries. It becomes especially
important for legislation that requires the drafting of
the national security strategy specifically for legislative body review. The involvement of civil society
(academia, think tanks, business, industry and, in the
case of South Africa, even clergy and NGOs like Green
Peace, and leadership at the local community level) is
becoming more important in a time of fiscal austerity. Both Australia and Brazil have been successful in
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including civil society and receiving their thinking on
national security issues through parliamentary hearings and formal public meetings.
Recommendation: To the degree possible, in addition to the legislative body of government and the
media, consider civil society to be an important audience and hold congressional/parliamentary hearings
that solicit their input. During the time of the drafting coordination process, strongly suggest that select
committees be briefed on the substantive content discussion of the strategy in order to obtain their input.
Immediately upon document release, would recommend specific presentations be provided to the entire legislative body either as a whole, or by relevant
committee (e.g., at a minimum in the United States,
it would be for congressional committees on foreign
relations, armed services, homeland security, intelligence, and appropriations).
National Interests and Domestic Political
Considerations.
Four of the five cases used prior national strategy
documents, the nation’s constitution, or presidential
speeches to help identify national interests. The UK
also employed its NSRA methodology to help determine and prioritize interests. For a democracy, most
important is to ensure that both the executive and legislative branches of government believe the national
interests that are identified are the right ones for the
nation at that point in time, and in priority order. The
national security environment of the 21st century
mandates that a national strategy encompass both domestic and external national interests.
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To the national security document drafters, the issue of domestic political considerations can be a twoedged sword. It can influence the strategy in such a
way that emphasizes some issues at the expense of
others, potentially forcing a political subjectivelybased prioritization for the strategy’s objectives. On
the other hand, an understanding of the political factors that permit the drafters to know what the American people will and will not support can ultimately
impact the development of the NSS and what it says.
These factors cannot simply be ignored in a democracy and in the end, domestic political considerations
can impose constraints which may be unavoidable.
Recommendation: Continue to employ prior national
strategy documents, the nation’s constitution, or presidential/prime minster’ speeches to help identify and
prioritize national interests. The ability to link interest
development to risk evaluation can have the added
benefit of providing greater detail to the description
of the national interest. Balance the necessity of taking
domestic political considerations into account with
the requirement to ensure, to the greatest degree possible, that the strategy’s end state aims and prioritization are unimpeded by political constraints.
Constrained or Unconstrained?
There are two major components of constraints
that can impact the national strategy development
process: domestic politics and resources (means). The
issue of domestic politics was addressed in the paragraph above. Constraints of resource means in the
national security arena typically relate to money, personnel, equipment, or technology. Australia and the
UK found it to their advantage to form national strat-
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egy documents that were based on the fiscal resources
that their related treasury departments and ministries
could make available. Other nontreasury related departments/ministries were already participating in
the formulation process and could address potential
personnel, equipment, and technology constraints. It
could be argued that details for a strategy are more
important in a time of resource (fiscal) austerity, thus
creating an argument for potential fiscal issues to be
understood early on in the strategy development process.
Recommendation: While the ideal is a strategy that
can be developed in completely unconstrained conditions, it is especially important during a time of austerity to understand potential limitations all throughout
the strategy drafting process. The departments/ministries/agencies that control or manage the fiscal resources should be invited to participate in the national
security strategy drafting process from the start. They
would be there to advise, not enforce limitations. The
national strategy document drafting process should
always begin with an unconstrained approach; the resource tradeoffs would then follow.
Identification of the Strategy’s Objectives
and Measures of Effectiveness.
There is no real difference between how the five
nations developed their strategy’s objectives; they
were related to the national interests. Most objectives
were aspirational in nature, thus allowing for flexibility on the part of the strategy.
Brazil was the only country that utilized a formal
approach utilizing measures of effectiveness for a national strategy. The Balanced Scorecard Performance
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Measurement System was applied to supporting objectives contained in the Brazilian NSD in coordination with the ways and means found in the NSD’s Implementation Measures section. Such an approach can
assist a strategy maker to determine when the strategy is succeeding and when it is not. This is especially
valid for a program designed to monitor the strategy’s
progress after the strategy has gone into effect.
Recommendation: Continue to establish objectives
for the strategy that are directly related to identified
national interests. Formalize a program to develop
measures of effectiveness for the strategy as it is being
implemented; to serve as an analytic tool to determine
how successful components of the strategy have been
towards the outcome of attainment of the strategy’s
objectives and when those components require adjustment. The measures of effectiveness should be used to
evaluate the ability of the ways (courses of action) to
approach attainment of the strategy’s objectives. All
of the above could be contained in a separate annex to
the strategy that focuses on measures of effectiveness.
Ways (Courses of Action) and Means.
Only the Brazilian NSD contained detailed ways
and means. Their presence in the Implementation
Measures portion of the Brazilian NSD, with a real degree of fidelity, provided sufficient detail to the planners in the ministries responsible for implementing
the NSD to begin planning how their respective ministries would execute the strategy. None of the other
national security related strategies could do that. In
particular, this has been a problem with NSSs in the
United States. “The 1998, 2000, (2002), and 2006 national security strategies . . . list goals without going
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into much detail as to how they might be achieved in a
practical sense.”326 The advantage to greater fidelity in
the ways and means is that the rest of the government
that has a stake in the strategy can immediately begin
working on implementation planning, to include requests for fiscal resources.
Recommendation: Provide as much detail as possible in the strategy’s ways and means. This should
be designed to specify the guidance necessary for the
implementing government departments/ministries
and agencies to use to begin detailed planning for
execution. The departments/ministries and agencies
with responsibility to execute individual ways should
be identified and directed to be responsible for their
component of that part of the strategy.
Risk Assessment.
The Australian and UK risk assessment processes
for national strategy development have become formalized in the last several years. As such, both countries have models that can be used to assess strategic
risk context, assessment, treatment, and review over
the course of time. Coupled with workshops that utilize the models on specific scenarios related to the
strategy being developed, the document drafters are
able to identify potential strategy spoilers as well as
modifiers to address the spoilers.
Recommendation: Include and formalize risk assessment analysis for all national security-type strategies.
Review the risk assessment models being utilized by
Australia and the UK for potential utilization for other
national strategies. Mandate that a risk assessment
annex that would include identification of potential
spoilers and associated modifiers be developed for
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the strategy. In the United States, something similar
is already being done at the classified level by the
Joint Staff on an annual basis for the National Military
Strategy.
Approval Authority.
The strategies for all five countries require final
executive branch approval, either by the president or
prime minister. This is logical since the chief executive is ultimately responsible for the nation’s national
security.
Recommendation: Retain the chief executive as the
final approving authority for the national security
strategy.
Feedback Mechanism.
Only Australia has created a formal system to regularly review (quarterly) the national strategy documents for success, failure, and potential modification.
This process is based upon submission of information
from the Australian DoD. Also, the United States developed a feedback mechanism for policies approved
by senior level meetings. Although not specifically
developed to support the NSS crafting effort, “Record 2008” was employed to monitor the evolution of
a number of key policies on a quarterly basis; if they
required a bit more effort, attention, or resources, or if
they would need a fundamental revision to attain the
aims that had been set. The complexities of the 21st
century require some sort of a formal monitoring effort to determine when a national strategy is succeeding and when it is not.
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Recommendation: Any nation crafting a national security strategy-type document should have a formal
process to continuously review that strategy for success, failure, and potential modification. It will require
formal guidance from the office of the nation’s chief
executive that directs the other department/ministry
and agency stakeholders in the strategy to provide
detailed information describing the progress of the
strategy on a regular basis. The review process should
be led by the actor in the executive branch that had responsibility for the document’s development. A public document should be produced every 2 years, or 2
years after the publication of the last national strategy,
that provides a review of the progress of the strategy,
as appropriate in terms of success, failure, and modification.
ENDNOTES
1. Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Strategy and the Strategic Way
of Thinking,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 60, No. 4, Autumn
2007, p. 111.
2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, New York: Doubleday, 1948, p. 36, as quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, Regaining Strategic Competence: Strategy for the Long
Haul, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009, p. 33.
3. Ronald Tuggle, (former Director of Strategic Planning, National Security Staff, The White House), in discussion with the author, September 14, 2011.
4. Thomas P. Reilly, “The National Security Strategy of the
United States: Development of Grand Strategy,” U.S. Army War
College Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA, May 3, 2004, p. 14.

125

5. Don M. Snider, The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, March 15, 1995, p. 2.
6. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14, 2011.
7. Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice
in Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1993, p. 20.
8. Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign
Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice, Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1980, p. 10.
9. Alan G. Stolberg, “Making National Security Policy in the
21st Century,” J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security
Policy and Strategy, 4th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2010, p. 30.
10. Richard B. Doyle, “The U.S. National Security Strategy:
Policy, Process, Problems,” Public Administration Review, No. 67,
Vol. 4, July/August 2007, p. 628.
11. Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous
Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly, December 1952, Vol. 67,
No. 4, p. 481.
12. Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, “A UK National Security Strategy:
Institutional and Cultural Challenges,” Defence Studies, March
2008, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 5, as referenced in Sharon L. Caudle, “National Security Strategies: Security from What, for Whom, and by
What Means,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2009, p. 8.
13. Wolfers, pp. 484-485; and David A. Baldwin,
“The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 23,
1997, p. 13.
14. Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic,
Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1943, p. 51, as quoted in Wolfers, p. 484.

126

15. Caudle, p. 1-3.
16. Baldwin, p. 12-17.
17. This paragraph and the one above are excerpted from
Alan G. Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century,” J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide
to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy and
Strategy, 4th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, July 2010, pp. 2-3.
18. Thomas G. Mahnken, “United States Strategic Culture,”
Science Applications International Corporation Report, Contract
No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction 18-06-02, revised
November 13, 2006, McLean, VA, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), p. 4.
19. Colin S. Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American
Example,” International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2, Fall 1981, p. 22, as
quoted in Mahnken, p. 4.
20. Mahnken, p. 3.
21. Michael Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s
Strategic Culture and Way of War, 1901-2005, Canberra, Australia:
Land Warfare Studies Center, 2005, as quoted in Mahnken, p. 3.
22. Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American
Statecraft, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 3.
23. Richard K. Betts, “U.S. National Security Strategy: Lenses and Landmarks,” paper presented for the launch conference of the Princeton Project “Toward a New National Security
Strategy,” November 2004, p. 7.
24. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: Department of
Defense, November 15, 2011.
25. Gregory D. Foster, “Missing and Wanted: A U.S. Grand
Strategy,” Strategic Review, Vol. 13, Fall 1985, p. 14, as referenced
in Deibel, p. 18.

127

26. John Lewis Gaddis, “Containment and the Logic of Strategy,” The National Interest, No. 10, Winter 1987-88, p. 29, as referenced in Deibel, p. 19; and Gaddis, Strategies of Containment,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. viii, as referenced in
Deibel, p. 4.
27. Charles M. Fergusson, Jr., “Statecraft and Military Force,”
Military Review, No. 46, February 1966, p. 70, as referenced in
Deibel, p. 19.
28. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France,
Germany, and Britain Between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1984, p. 13, as quoted in Deibel, p. 417.
29. Doyle, p. 624.
30. The George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, “Module 9—National Security Strategy: Processes
and Structures,” 2003, available from www.marshallcenter.org/
site-graphic/lang-en/page-coll-ep-1/xdocs/coll/ep-syllabus-03-05/
module-09.htm, and quoted by John K. Bartolotto, “The Origin of
the Developmental Process of the National Security Strategy,”
U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA,
May 3, 2004, p. 6.
31. Doyle, p. 624.
32. Caudle, p. 10-11.
33. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Hearings Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on National Security Strategy, Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, April, 3, 1987, p. 1054.
34. Stephen D. Krasner, “An Orienting Principle for Foreign
Policy,” Policy Review, No. 163, October 1, 2010, p. 1, available
from www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/49786.
35. Foster, p. 14, as quoted in Deibel, p. 12.
36. Helmut Schmidt, A Grand Strategy for the West, New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985, p. 5-6, as referenced in
Deibel, p. 417.
128

37. Professor Julian Lindley-French, “”Who Does National
Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,” Written Evidence Submitted to the House of Commons, September
2010, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/
cmselect/cmpubadm/435/435we13.htm.
38. Edwin Meade Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943, p. viii, as referenced in Deibel, p. 416.
39. Clark A. Murdock, Improving the Practice of National
Security Strategy: A New Approach for the Post-Cold War World,
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2004, p. 14.
40. Collins English Dictionary—Complete and Unabridged, New
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003.
41. Jennifer Taylor and Emily Boggs, “Strategic Defense
Reviews: Procedures, Frameworks, and Tools to Enhance Future Defense Institution Building Projects,” A Report of the CSIS
New Defense Approaches Project, Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, September 2011, p. 3.
42. Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International
Security, No. 25, Fall 2000, p. 6, as quoted in Deibel, p. 9.
43. See Doyle, p. 625; Deibel, p. 9; and Murdock, p. 9.
44. Carnes Lord, “Strategy and Organization at the National
Level,” Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process, Washington,
DC: National Defense University Press, 1991, p. 143; Doyle, p. 628;
and Caudle, p. 6.
45. Kevin Rudd, “The First National Security Statement to
the Australian Parliament,” public address given, December 4,
2008, available from www.dpmc.gov.au/national_security/docs/2008National-Security-Statement.pdf; and Joel Fitzgibbon, Defence White
Paper 2009: Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force
2030, Canberra, Australia: Defence Publishing Service, 2009.

129

46. Carl Ungerer, “The Case for an Australian National Security Strategy,” Policy Analysis, Strategic Policy Institute, July 28,
2011, p. 8.
47. Michael L’Estrange (former Secretary of the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and current Director, National Security College, Australian National University), in discussion with
the author, September 29, 2011.
48. John Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, Canberra,
Australia: Defence Publishing Service, 2010, p. 20.
49. David Connery (Deputy Director, National Security College, Australian National University) email to the author, May 12,
2012.
50. Michael Pezullo (former Head of the 2009 White Paper
drafting team and current Chief Operating Officer for the Customs and Border Protection Service), in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011.
51. Stewart Woodman (Professor, Australian Defence Force
Academy), email to the author, May 21, 2012.
52. Patrick Walters, “The Making of the 2009 Defence White
Paper,” Security Challenges, Vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 2009, p. 1.
53. Rudd, “The First National Security Statement to the
Australian Parliament.”
54. Joel Fitzgibbon, “Speech to the National Press Club of
Australia: Labor’s Defence Reform Project—Meeting Strategic
Challenges in the 21st Century,” July 30, 2008, available from
www.defence.gov.au/minister/FitzgibbonSpeechtpl.
cfm?CurrentId=8020, as cited in John Angevine, “Self-Reliance
Defence of Australia: Creating a Dependent Australian Defence
Force?” unpublished paper, March 8, 2011, p. 4.
55. Greg Raymond (Director, Strategic Policy Guidance, Department of Defence) and Bryden Spurling (Deputy Director,
Strategic Policy Guidance, Department of Defence), in discussion
with the author, September 27, 2011.

130

56. Ibid.
57. Kevin Rudd et al., Labor’s Plan for Defence: Election 2007
Policy Document, Canberra, Australia: T. Gartrell, November 2007,
p.2, as referenced in Walters, p. 2-3.
58. Walters, p. 6.
59. Pezullo, in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011;
and L’Estrange, in discussion with the author, September 29, 2011.
60. Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, p. 10; and Australian Government, “The Australian Intelligence Community:
Agencies, Functions, Accountability, and Oversight,” 2006, p. 13.
61. Pezullo, as referenced in Patrick Walters, “The Making of
the 2009 Defence White Paper,” Security Challenges, Vol. 5, No. 2
Winter 2009, pp. 9-10; and Pezullo, in discussion with the author,
September 28, 2011.
62. Raymond and Spurling, in discussion with the author,
September 27, 2011.
63. Ibid.
64. Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, pp. 10-11, and
Rudd, “The First National Security Statement to the Australian
Parliament.”
65. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author,
September 27, 2011.
66. Pezullo, in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011;
and Marc Ablong (former Chief of Staff for the 2009 White Paper
drafting team and current Assistant Secretary for Strategic Issues
Management, Ministerial Support and Public Affairs Division,
Department of Defence), in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.
67. Sarah Guise (primary drafter of the 2008 National Security
Statement and current Senior Advisor for Counter Terrorism and

131

Border Security, Homeland and Border Security Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet), in discussion with the
author, September 29, 2011.
68. Graham Eveille (Assistant Secretary, Defence Policy and
Operations Branch, Defence Intelligence and Research Coordination Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet), in
discussion with the author, September 28, 2011.
69. Raymond and Spurling, in discussion with the author,
September 27, 2011; and Ablong, email to the author, May 22,
2012.
70. Ablong, email to the author, May 22, 2012.
71. Guise, in discussion with the author, September 29, 2011.
72. Ibid.
73. Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, p. 18; Department
of Defence, Key Questions for Defence in the 21st Century: A Defence
Policy Discussion Paper, Canberra, Australia: Defence Publishing
Service, 2008; and Department of Defence, Looking Over the Horizon: Australians Consider Defence, Canberra, Australia: Defence
Publishing Service, December 2008.
74. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author,
September 27, 2011.
75. Ibid.
76. Stephen McFarlane (Assistant Secretary, Intelligence Policy Branch, Defence Intelligence and Research Coordination Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet), in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011 and in email received
May 8, 2012.
77. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author,
September 27, 2011.
78. Carl Ungerer and Anthony Bergin, “The Devil in the Detail: Australia’s First National Security Statement,” Policy Analysis,

132

Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December
10, 2008, p. 2.
79. L’Estrange, in discussion with the author, September
29, 2011.
80. Pezullo, in discussion with the author, September 28, 2011.
81. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author,
September 27, 2011.
82. Ibid.
83. Ablong, in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.
84. Ibid.
85. Raymond and Spurling in discussion with the author,
September 27, 2011.
86. Ablong, in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.
87. Walters, pp. 7, 10.
88. Joel Fitzgibbon, Defence White Paper 2009, p. 138, as quoted
in Walters, p. 8.
89. Guise, in discussion with the author, September 29, 2011.
90. Ungerer and Bergin, “The Devil in the Detail: Australia’s
First National Security Statement,” p. 3.
91. L’Estrange, in discussion with the author, September
29, 2011.
92. Raymond and Spurling, in discussion with the author,
September 27, 2011.
93. Department of Defence, “Strategic Risk Assessment for the
(Australian) Force Structure Review and Related Defence White
Paper Processes,” unpublished paper, 2008, p. 1-2.

133

94. Ibid.
95. Ablong, in discussion with the author, September 27, 2011.
96. Ibid.; and Guise, in discussion with the author, September
29, 2011, and in an May 8, 2012 email.
97. Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, p. i.
98. Connery, email to the author, May 12, 2012.
99. Colonel Cunha Mattos (Analyst, Army Design Project,
Policy and Strategy Directorate, Army Staff), in discussion with
the author, August 8, 2011.
100. Colonel (Retired) Marcos Antonio (former Coordinator
for the MOD Working Group on the NSD and current Manager,
Strategic Defense Section, Joint Staff of the Armed Forces) and
Captain Rafael Santos (former Strategy and Policy Advisor, Secretariat of Policy, Strategy, and International Affairs, MOD, for the
NSD, and current Advisor, Policy and Strategic Planning Division, Navy Staff), in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.
101. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, National Strategy of Defense,
Brazilia, Brazil: December 17, 2008, p. 5.
102. Colonel Edson Diehl Ripoli (seconded to the Ministry of
Strategic Affairs Working Group that wrote the first draft of the
NSD and currently on the personal staff of the Army Commander), in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011; and “Brazil’s
Pursuit of a Nuclear Submarine Raises Proliferation Concerns,”
WMD Insights, March 5, 2008.
103. General Brigade (2 star) Luiz Linhares (seconded to the
Ministry of Strategic Affairs Working Group that wrote the first
draft of the NSD and currently the Deputy Chief of Personnel,
Army Staff), in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011.
104. Ibid.
105. Linhares; and Captain (Retired) Ruiz Campos
(seconded to the Ministry of Strategic Affairs Working Group that

134

wrote the first draft of the NSD), in discussion with the author,
August 8, 2011.
106. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011.
107. Lula da Silva, p. 5.
108. Linhares; and Campos, in discussion with the author,
August 8, 2011.
109. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011.
110. Linhares, in an email to the author, May 1, 2012.
111. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.
112. Linhares; and Campos, in discussion with the author,
August 8, 2011; and Antonio, in discussion with the author,
August 9, 2011.
113. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.
114. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011.
115. Plano Brasil de Todos, August 2003, as quoted in European
Commission, Brazil Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013, 14.05.2007
(E/2007/889), p. 6, available from eeas.europa.eu/brazil/csp/07_13_
en.pdf.
116. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011.
117. Ibid.
118. “Titulo I—Dos Principios Fundamentais da Constituicao
Federal,” Federal Constitution of Brazil, 2003, available from www.
planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constitui%C3%A7ao.htm.
119. Ibid.; Antonio, in discussion with the author, August 9,
2011; and Lula da Silva, p. 14.
120. Mattos, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011.

135

121. Antonio and Santos, in discussion with the author,
August 9, 2011.
122. Linhares, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011.
123. Ibid.
124. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011
125. Antonio, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.
126. Ibid.; and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, National Defense
Policy, June 30, 2008, p. 14, 19-21.
127. Mattos, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011,
as described in Balanced Scorecard Institute, “Performance
Measurement,” available from www.balancedscorecard.org/BSC
Resources/PerformanceMeasurement/tabid/59/Default.aspx.
128. Colonel Pinheiro Evandro (Chief, Strategic Follow-On
Section, Policy and Strategy Directorate, Army Staff), in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.
129. Lula da Silva, pp. 49-50.
130. Ripoli, in discussion with the author, August 7, 2011.
131. Antonio, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011;
and Lula da Silva, p. 42.
132. Lula da Silva, pp. 42-70.
133. Santos, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.; and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, National Strategy of
Defense, December 17, 2008, p. 66-70.
136. Mattos, in discussion with the author, August 8, 2011.

136

137. Antonio, in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011;
Brazilian Complementary Act no. 136 of August 25, 2010, Diário
Oficial da União (Brasilia), August 26, 2010, as described in Sam
Perlo-Freeman, et al., “Military Expenditure,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 2011, Stockholm, Sweden:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, p. 173, available from www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/files/SIPRIYB1104-04A-04B.
pdf; and General of Division Julio (Chief Advisor for MOD Strategic Planning), in discussion with the author, August 9, 2011.
138. Major General (Ret.) Len le Roux (former Director of
Strategy for the Chief of Defense Forces), email to the author, June
24, 2011.
139. Len le Roux, “The South African National Defence Force
and its Involvement in the Defence Review Process,” Ourselves
to Know: Civil Military Relations and Defence Transformation in
Southern Africa, Rocky Williams et al., eds., Pretoria, South Africa:
Institute for Security Studies, 2003, p. 156.
140. Ibid.
141. Dr. Deon Fourie, (retired Professor of Strategic Studies
at the University of South Africa, Brigadier General (Ret.) South
African Army Reserve, and one of the advisors for both the White
Paper and Defence Review), in discussion with the author, June
30, 2011.
142. “Chapter 1: Introduction,” White Paper on National
Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 8, 1996, available from
www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1996/defencwp.htm.
143. “Chapter 1: Introduction Aim and Focus,” South African
Defence Review, 1998, available from www.dod.mil.za/documents/
defencereview/defence%20review1998.pdf; and Mr. Helmoed Heitman (South African defense consultant that advised on the both
the White Paper and Defence Review), in discussion with the author, June 30, 2011.
144. RADM R.W. Higgs (current Chief of the South African
Naval Staff and the Navy representative for the 1998 Defence Review), in discussion with the author, June 29, 2011.

137

145. Gavin Cawthra, “From Total Strategy to Human Security: The Making of South Africa’s Defence Policy,” Copenhagen,
Denmark: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1999, available
from www.ciaonet.org/wps/cag02/, as quoted in James Ngculu, “The
Role of the Parliamentary Defence Committees in Ensuring Effective Oversight: The South African Experience,” Ourselves to Know:
Civil Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa, Rocky Williams, et al., eds., Pretoria, South Africa: Institute
for Security Studies, 2003, p. 180; and Len le Roux, email to the
author, April 16, 2012.
146. Ngculu, “The Role of the Parliamentary Defence Committees in Ensuring Effective Oversight,” p. 181.
147. “Chapter 1: Introduction,” White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa; and Brigadier General (Ret.)
John Wesley, South African Air Force, Air Force member on the
White Paper drafting committee, in discussion with the author,
June 30, 2011.
148. Le Roux, email to the author, June 24, 2011.
149. “Chapter 1: Introduction Aim and Focus”; “Chapter 15:
Conclusion,” South African Defence Review, 1998, available from
www.dod.mil.za/documents/defencereview/defence%20review1998.pdf;
and Mr. Helmoed Heitman (South African defense consultant
that advised on the both the White Paper and Defence Review), in
discussion with the author, June 30, 2011.
150. Cawthra.
151. Le Roux, email to the author, June 24, 2011.
152. Susanna Bearne et al., “National Security Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform,” Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corporation Europe Technical Report, 2005, p. 11.
153. Higgs, in discussion with the author, June 29, 2011.
154. “Chapter 1: Introduction Aim and Focus,” South African
Defence Review.

138

155. Le Roux, emails to the author, June 24, 2011 and April 16,
2012; Heitman, in discussion with the author, June 30, 2011; and
Wesley, in discussion with the author, June 30, 2011.
156. Cawthra.
157. Ibid.
158. Kai Michael Kenkel, “Civil Society Participation in Defence Policy Formulation: Academic Experts and South Africa’s
Post-Apartheid Defence White Paper,” Journal of Security Sector
Management, Vol. 4, No.1, January 2006, p. 9.
159. Le Roux, email to the author, June 24, 2011; Heitman, in
discussion with the author, June 30, 2011
160. Fatoumatta M’boge and Sam Gbaydee Doe, “African
Commitments to Civil Society Engagement: A Review of 8 NEPAD Countries,” African Human Security Initiative Paper 6,
August 2004, p. 1, available from www.iss.co.za/pubs/Other/ahsi/
Mboge_Doe/Contents.html.
161. Bearne et al., p. 13.
162. Wesley, in discussion with the author, June 30, 2011.
163. Deon Fourie, “From Executive War to Defence by Constitution: South African Defence Policy Making from 1914-2002,”
unpublished paper delivered at a conference in Santiago, Chile,
1999, p. 12.
164. Le Roux, email to the author, June 24, 2011.
165. Rocky Williams, “Defence in a Democracy: The South
African Defence Review and the Redefintion of the Parameters
of the National Defence Debate,” Ourselves to Know: Civil Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa, Rocky
Williams et al., eds., Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security
Studies, 2003, p. 206.
166. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, available from www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/.
139

167. Le Roux, email to the author, June 24, 2011.
168. Higgs, in discussion with the author, June 29, 2011.
169. “Chapter 4: The Strategic Environment,” White Paper on
National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 8, 1996, available from www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1996/defencwp.htm, as quoted in Francois Very, “From Theory to Culture: Emergent South
African Strategic Culture,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,
Vol. 9, Issue 3, Spring 2006, p. 18-19.
170. Laurie Nathan, “Beyond Arms and Armed Forces: A
New Approach to Security,” South African Defence Review, No. 4,
1992, pp. 12, as quoted in Kai Michael Kenkel, “Civil Society Participation in Defence Policy Formulation: Academic Experts and
South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Defence White Paper,” Journal of
Security Sector Management, Vol. 4, No.1, January 2006, p. 11.
171. Cawthra, “From Total Strategy to Human Security.”
172. Ibid.
173. Le Roux, emails to the author, June 24, 2011 and April
16, 2012.
174. Heitman, email to the author, April 22, 2011.
175. “Chapter 15: Conclusion,” South African Defence
Review, 1998.
176. Heitman, email to the author, April 22, 2011.
177. Sir David Omand (former Permanent Secretary and Security and Intelligence Coordinator, the UK Cabinet Office), email
to the author, March 26, 2012.
178. Mark Phillips, (Advisor to the Conservative Shadow
Government), email to the author, April 18, 2012.
179. A United Kingdom (UK) official involved in the development of the national security strategy (NSS), in discussion with
the author, June 28, 2011.
140

180. Sir David Omand, “In the National Interest: Organizing
Government for National Security,” The DEMOS Annual Security Lecture, December 2006, available from www.demos.co.uk/files/
Organising_government_for_national_security.pdf?1240939425.
181. Charlie Edwards, “The Case for a National Security
Strategy,” DEMOS Report, February 2007, p. 3, available from
www.demos.co.uk/files/Demos_report_the_case_for_a_national_
security_strategy.pdf?1240939425.
182. Paddy Ashdown and George Robertson, “Independent
Commission on National Security,” London, UK: Institute for
Public Policy Research, October 25, 2007, available from www.
ippr.org/articles/56/956/independent-commission-on-national-security.
183. Ibid., pp. 13-15.
184. Omand and another official involved in the development
of the NSS, in discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.
185. Prime Minister Gordon Brown, “The National Strategy
of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World,”
March 2008; Prime Minister Gordon Brown, “The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009: Security for the
Next Generation,” June 2009; Prime Minister David Cameron and
Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, “A Strong Britain in an Age of
Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,” October 2010; and
Prime Minister David Cameron and Deputy Prime Minister Nick
Clegg, “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic
Defense and Security Review,” October 2010.
186. Charlie Edwards, “National Security for the Twenty-First
Century,” DEMOS Report, 2007, p. 15, available from www.demos.
co.uk/publications/nationalsecurityforthetwentyfirstcentury.
187. A UK official involved in the development of the NSS, in
discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.
188. Mr. Struan McDonald (Acting Head, Strategy Unit, UK
MOD), in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.
189. Omand, email to the author, March 26, 2012.
141

190. A UK official involved in the development of the NSS, in
discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.
191. Ibid.
192. A senior UK government official, in discussion with the
author, June 28, 2011.
193. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011;
and a senior government official, in discussion with the author,
June 28, 2011.
194. A senior UK government official, in discussion with the
author, June 28, 2011.
195. Institute for Government and the Libra Advisory Group,
“Who Does National Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,” Written Evidence Submitted to the House of Commons, August 2010, available from www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubadm/435/435we07.htm.
196. Phillips, in discussion with the author, June 14, 2011.
197. Samuel Selvadurai (Strategy Officer, Foreign Commonwealth Office [FCO] Policy Unit), in discussion with the author,
June 27, 2011.
198. UK Cabinet Office National Security Secretariat, “UK
National Security Strategy: National Risk Assessment—Methodology,” unpublished paper, 2010.
199. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011;
and Cameron and Clegg, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The Strategic Defence and Security Review, p. 9.
200. A UK official involved in the development of the NSS, in
discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.
201. Cabinet Office, “Who Does National Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,” Written Evidence

142

Submitted to the House of Commons, September 2010, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/
cmpubadm/435/435we04.htm.
202. Ibid.
203. Ibid; and McDonald, in discussion with the author, June
27, 2011.
204. A senior UK government official, in discussion with the
author, June 28, 2011.
205. IPPR, “Shared Responsibilities: A National Security
Strategy for the UK,” The Final Report of the IPPR Commission
on National Security in the 21st Century, June 2009, available
from www.ippr.org.
206 . Right Honorable Oliver Letwin, MP, “Who Does National Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,”
Written Evidence Submitted to the House of Commons, August
2010, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/
cmselect/cmpubadm/435/435we03.htm.
207. Dr. Robin Niblett, ”Who Does National Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,” Written Evidence
Submitted to the House of Commons, October 18, 2010, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/
cmpubadm/435/435we09.htm.
208. Letwin.
209. Phillips, email to the author, April 18, 2012.
210. A UK official involved in the development of the NSS, in
discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.
211. Selvadurai, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.
212. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.
213. Cabinet Office, ”Who Does National Strategy—Public
Administration Committee Contents.”

143

214. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.
215. Cabinet Office, ”Who Does National Strategy.”
216. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011;
Selvadurai, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011; and a
senior government official, in discussion with the author, June
28, 2011.
217. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.
218. Ibid.
219. A senior UK government official, in discussion with the
author, June 28, 2011.
220. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.
221. Omand, email to the author, March 26, 2012.
222. A senior UK government official, in discussion with the
author, June 28, 2011.
223. Phillips, email to the author, April 18, 2012.
224. Andrew Simpson, “Defence Acquistion,” Evaluating
the 2010 Strategy Review, London, UK: Chatham House, October
2010, p. 13.
225. Chancellor of the Exchequer, “Spending Review 2010,”
October 2010, p. 9, available from cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sr2010_
completereport.pdf; and an official involved in the development of
the NSS, in discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.
226. Phillips, email to the author, April 18, 2012.
227. Cameron and Clegg, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, p. 25.
228. Selvadurai, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.

144

229. National Security Secretariat, “UK National Security
Strategy: National Security Risk Assessment—Methodology,”
unpublished paper, undated, p. 1.
230. Omand, in discussion with the author, June 28, 2011; and
Phillips, email to the author, April 18, 2012.
231. National Security Secretariat, “UK National Security
Strategy: National Security Risk Assessment—Methodology,”
pp. 2, 10.
232. Ibid, pp. 6-7.
233. National Security Secretariat, “UK National Security
Strategy: National Security Risk Assessment—Methodology,”
pp. 9-10.
234 . Cameron and Clegg, A Strong Britain in an Age of
Uncertainty, p. 25-27.
235. Ibid, p. 28.
236. Cameron and Clegg, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, pp. 10-12.
237. Phillips, in discussion with the author, June 14, 2011.
238. McDonald, in discussion with the author, June 27, 2011.
239. Paul Cornish, “Indecision by Design,” Evaluating the 2010
Strategy Review, London, UK: Chatham House, October 2010, p. 3.
240. Nick Birks, “Who Does National Strategy—Public Administration Committee Contents,” Written Evidence
Submitted to the House of Commons, September 2010, available from www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/
cmpubadm/435/435we08.htm.
241. A UK official involved in the development of the NSS, in
discussion with the author, June 28, 2011.
242. National Security Act of 1947, “National Security Strategy Report,” Public Law 80-235, Section 108, July 26, 1947; and
145

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,
“Annual National Security Strategy Report,” Public Law 99-433,
Section 104, October 1, 1986.
243. Catherine Dale, “National Security Strategy: Legislative
Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service RL 34505, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 15, 2008, p. 2.
244. Ibid., p. 3.
245. Dale, “National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates,
Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress,” p. 13.
246. Ibid, p. 14-15.
247. Colonel Ronald Tuggle (Director for Strategic Planning,
NSS Staff, from 2009-2011 and current Chief of Staff for Arlington
Cemetery), email to the author, May 31, 2012.
248. Don M. Snider, “The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision,” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 15, 1995, pp. 5-6.
249. Dale, “National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates,
Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress,” p. 17.
250. Tuggle, email to the author, May 31, 2012; and Ambassador Mary C. Yates (Special Assistant to the President and Special
Advisor of Strategic Planning, National Security Staff), email to
the author, June 4, 2012.
251. Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, “Strategy
for the Long Haul: Regaining Strategic Confidence,” Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009, p. 12.
252. Federation of American Scientists, “Presidential Directives and Executive Orders,” available from www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/direct.htm.
253. “Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism,” GAO-04-

146

408T, Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, February 3,
2004, p. 6; and Tuggle, email to the author, May 31, 2012.
254. Stephen J. Hadley (former Deputy National Security Advisor to the President in the first Bush 43 administration and the
National Security Advisor to the President in the second Bush 43
administration), in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011;
and Condoleezza Rice (National Security Advisor to the President
during the First Administration of Bush 43), in discussion with
the author, April 30, 2012. NSC-68 was drafted by a small group
of personnel from the Departments of State and Defense, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff under the leadership of Paul Nitze from the
State Department Policy Planning Staff, and all at the direction of
the Secretaries of State and Defense. See Steven L. Rearden, “Paul
H. Nitze and NSC 68: ‘Militarizing’ the Cold War,” in The Policy
Makers: Shaping American Foreign Policy from 1947 to the Present,
Anna Kasten Nelson, ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2009, pp. 5-28.
255. Zelikow, in discussion with the author, November
11, 2011.
256. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.
257. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011;
Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012; Zelikow, in
discussion with the author, November 11, 2011; and Hadley, in
discussion with the author, December 20, 2011.
258. Hadley, in discussion with the author, December 20,
2011 and as quoted in Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor:
A Memoir of My Years in Washington, New York: Crown Publishers, 2011, p. 153.
259. Ibid.; and Zelikow, in discussion with the author,
November 11, 2011.
260. Rice, email to the author, May 30, 2012; and Hadley,
email to the author, May 30, 2012.
261. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.

147

262. “Senator Robert Byrd stands up for our Constitution,”
Portland Independent Media Center, October 14, 2002, available
from portland.indymedia.org/en/2002/10/105485.shtml.
263. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.
264. George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United
States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, available from georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/
nss/2002/.
265. Hadley, in discussion with the author, December
20, 2011.
266. Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012.
267. “Governor Bush Discusses Foreign Policy in Speech
at Ronald Reagan Library,” November 19, 1999, available from
www.fas.org/news/usa/1999/11/pr111999_nn.htm; “Bush’s Speech at
the Citadel,” New York Times.com, December 11, 2001; and Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 79, No. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 45-62, as cited by Hadley, in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011.
268. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.
269. Ibid.
270. As quoted by Hadley, in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011.
271. Esther Pan identifies 16 measures of effectiveness for
progress towards democratization and development. See Pan,
“Millenium Challenge Account,” Council on Foreign Affairs Backgrounder, May 28, 2004, available from www.cfr.org/pakistan/
foreign-aid-millennium-challenge-account/p7748, as cited by Condoleezza Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012.
272. Zelikow, in discussion with the author, November
11, 2011.
273. Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012; and
Department of State, “Broader Middle East and North Africa
148

Initiative (BMENA),”
bmena.state.gov/.

December

2004,

available

from

274. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.
275. Zelikow, in discussion with the author, November
11, 2011.
276. George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United
States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, September
2002, p. 16, available from georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/
nss/2002/.
277. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.
278. Ibid.
279. Rice, in discussion with the author, April 30, 2012.
280. Biegun, in discussion with the author, December 8, 2011.
281. Ibid.
282. Peter Feaver (Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and
Institutional Reform, NSC Staff, from 2005-07, and current Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, NC), in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; and
Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.
283. Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012,
and in email to the author, May 30, 2012.
284. William C. Inboden (Senior Director for Strategic Planning, NSC Staff, during the 2d Bush 43 Administration, and current Assistant Professor of Public Affairs, University of Texas,
Austin, Texas), in discussion with the author, September 6, 2011;
Peter Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011;
and Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.
285. Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.
286. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September
6, 2011.
149

287. Ibid.; and Hadley, in discussion with the author,
February 16, 2012.
288. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011.
289. Ibid.; and Dr. Joseph J. Collins (lead for the National War
College “Red Team” in summer-fall 2005, and current Professor
of National Security Strategy, National War College, Washington,
DC), in discussion with the author, November 28, 2011.
290. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September
6, 2011.
291. Ibid.
292. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011; and Hadley, in discussion with the author,
February 16, 2012.
293. Ibid.
294. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September
6, 2011.
295. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011;
and Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.
296. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 6,
2011; Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011;
and Hadley, in discussion with the author, February 16, 2012.
297. Inboden, in discussion with the author, September 6,
2011; and Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9,
2011.
298. Feaver, in discussion with the author, November 9, 2011.
299. Ibid.
300. Barry Pavel (Senior Director for Defense Strategy from
2008-2010, NSS Staff, and current director of the International

150

Security Program and director-designate of the Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council of the
United States), in discussion with the author, December 20, 2011,
and email to the author, June 9, 2012; and Tuggle, in discussion
with the author, September 14, 2011.
301. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14,
2011; and Thomas Greenwood (Director for Strategic Planning,
NSS Staff, from 2009-2011, and current Director for Pakistan, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for South and Central
Asia, OSD), in discussion with the author, May 2, 2012.
302. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September
14, 2011.
303. Ambassador Mary C. Yates (Special Assistant to the President and Special Advisor of Strategic Planning, National Security
Staff during crafting of the 2010 NSS), in discussion with the author, June 1, 2012.
304. Ibid.; Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September
14, 2011, NYTimes.com, “Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo,” Cairo, Egypt, June 4, 2009, available from www.nytimes.com/2009/
06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=all; and The White
House, “Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel
Peace Prize,” Oslo, Norway, December 10, 2009, available from
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptancenobel-peace-prize.
305. Yates, in discussion with the author, June 1, 2012.
306. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September
14, 2011.
307. Ibid.
308. Yates, in discussion with the author, June 1, 2012.
309. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September
14, 2011.

151

310. Ibid.; and The White House, National Security Strategy,
May 2010, p. 7.
311. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14,
2011; and Pavel, in discussion with the author, June 7, 2012.
312. Ibid.
313. The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010,
pp. 17-50.
314. Tuggle, in discussion with the author, September 14,
2011, and email to the author, May 31, 2012; and Yates, email to
the author, June 4, 2012.
315. Ibid.
316. Yates, in discussion with the author, June 1, 2012, and
email to the author, June 4, 2012.
317. The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010.
318. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986, “Annual National Security Strategy Report,” Public Law
99-433, Section 104, October 1, 1986.
319. National Security Act of 1947, “National Security Strategy
Report,” Public Law 80-235, Section 108, July 26, 1947.
320. Ungerer, “The Case for an Australian National Security
Strategy,” p. 7.
321. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986.
322. Hadley, in discussion with the author, December
20, 2011.
323. Duke Sanford School of Public Policy, “Peter D. Feaver,”
available from fds.duke.edu/db/Sanford/pfeaver.

152

324. John Faulkner, The Strategy Framework: 2010, Canberra,
Australia: Defence Publishing Service, 2010.
325. Inboden, in discussion with the author,
6, 2011.

September

326. Krepinevich and Watts, Regaining Strategic Competence:
Strategy for the Long Haul, p. 12.

153

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
Author
Dr. Alan G. Stolberg
Director of Publications
Dr. James G. Pierce
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

